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ABSTRACT
Wahlert, Matthew H. M.A. International and Comparative Politics, Wright State
University, 2007. Non-State Actors and Asymmetric Warfare: A New Paradigm for
International Relations.
A billiard table metaphorically explains the conduct of states within the international
system– sometimes clashing and other times tenuously co-existing. Yet, the international
system ultimately remains a construct and pattern for the state actors. Spatially, the
dimensions and context of the system fit the needs, requirements, and structure of the
states. However, the system is one dimensional and does not account for the realities of
the complexities inherent to the post Cold War Era. Currently, the state actor does not
maintain an exclusive monopoly in the formation of the playing field. However, non-state
actors usurp space and dimensions not defined by the state actor. In addition, the nature
of the non-state actor allows for swift, fluid, and dynamic movement in order to capitalize
on the emerging multidimensional nature of the international system. I intend to use a
host of sources of current literature as well as qualitative processes, in the form of case
study, and quantitative methods in order to show: (1) the nature and components of the
international system changed after the fall of the Soviet Union and globalization, (2) the
threat from non-state actors has increased with the fall of the Soviet Union, and (3) the
failed state has become part and parcel of both the "new" international system and a
significant factor in the emergence of non-state actors.
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Chapter One
Introduction
Admittedly, the study and discussion that follows poses a number of questions and only
attempts to provide a starting point for research aimed at discovering what can best be
described as the evolving nature of international politics in a multi-level and nested
system – calling on both state level and international variables.
That said, the overall argument of this paper is that changes in the ordering of
power in the international system along with reduced levels of state effectiveness and
legitimacy have allowed non-state actors to more freely operate at both the state and
system levels. This is not to say that non-state actors could not be a factor in times past –
the discussion that follows on the Muslim Brotherhood illustrates the role of non-state
actors dating back some eighty years. But, at the same time, the historical role of the nonstate actor was typically restrained in a geographic sense. In addition, the impact of failed
and inadequate states has been an historical concern – as seen in the examples dating
back several hundred years in the discussion of failed states that follows. Changes in the
international and state levels of political behavior, however, have elevated the failed and
inadequate state to a more significant position in international politics. What has
occurred, furthermore, is a number of changes in the international system and individual
state systems that act as variables – and even, at times, enhanced variables – in order to
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change the overall portrait of international politics. I have attempted to provide
theoretical arguments and case studies that will demonstrate the evolving nature of
international politics. Be that as it may, a certain key assumption was made in order to
provide a starting point for the research that follows. Specifically, I have made the
assumption that international politics is a nested game. Specifically, changes in system
and state level variables often play a role in both levels of analysis. The concept of
foreign policy as an expression of multiple levels of analysis appears in the literature of a
number of comparative foreign policy researchers from the so-called second generation
of foreign policy research. For the remainder of the conclusions, I have provided
theoretical as well as case study evidence that is both quantitative and qualitative.
Ultimately, my argument is that changes in the international system and state systems
have altered the overall nature of international politics. Toward that end, I will be
exploring such varied subjects as the end of the Cold War, the impetus for states to
liberalize both economically and politically, failed and inadequate states, the nature of
power, the way war has been fought and is being fought, trends in terrorism, and the
perception individuals have concerning their own place in the international system. It is
my contention that each of these variables acts as both a dependent and independent
variable.

2

A series of equations summarizes the arguments within this paper:

Table 1 - Overall Depiction of Argument in Equation Form
X
Y
Z
Δ

=
=
=
=

the international system
the state system
more powerful non-state actors
change
ΔX
ΔX
X

+
+
+

ΔY =
Y =
ΔY =

Z
Z
Z

All three equations represent the reality that changes in the international
system, state system, or both have resulted in more powerful non-state
actors.
And – conversely ….
Z

= ΔX

This equation represents the notion that stronger non-state actors have
resulted in changes in the behavior of the international system.
In short, the purpose of my effort is multifaceted. I intend to use a host of sources of
current literature as well as qualitative processes, in the form of case study, and
quantitative methods in order to show: (1) the nature and components of the international
system changed after the fall of the Soviet Union and globalization, (2) the threat from
non-state actors has increased with the fall of the Soviet Union, and (3) the failed state
has become part and parcel of both the "new" international system and a significant factor
in the emergence of non-state actors, moreover, the elevated significance of the failed
state comes as the result of changes within the international system as well as state level
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pressures that have transformed the nature of the sate making it less effective and less
legitimate.
Toward that end, Chapter Two – The International System - offers a very brief
history of the progression of the international system from the Treaty of Westphalia until
contemporary times. In addition, I stress the evolving nature of the international system
and offer an introduction into the advent of a "new" international political reality
featuring the loss of supremacy on behalf of state actors. Chapter Three is devoted to a
wide-ranging look at the changing nature of the state and its place in the international
system. I place specific importance upon the dynamic nature of state actors, once again,
in historical context. Next, Chapter Four includes a synopsis of the failed state, the
emergence of the notion of a failed state and how it fits the overall emerging model of
international relations and, also, the role a failed state plays in the growing relevancy of
non-state actors. Chapter Five examines how warfare – like the state and international
system – is ultimately a social construct and is subject to changing agreements by
interested actors. Chapter Six includes a case study analysis of the Muslim Brotherhood
and its contemporary relative – al-Qaeda – and how it evolved within the changing state
and international systems. The foundation supplied by such an evaluation of literature
utilizes an original case study of a non-state actor in the form of Political Islam and the
International Muslim Brotherhood movement and its ultimate expression with Osama bin
Laden’s al-Qaeda organization. Finally, Chapter Seven offers concluding remarks
designed to construct an overall paradigm from the varied inputs studied in the previous
chapters for use in predicting outcomes and use in the broader typologies of systemic and
terror studies. The inquiry concentrates on both grand level implications as well as
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security ramifications for the United States. In this final chapter, I also discuss areas for
further research and study limitations.

5

Chapter Two
The International System
In the equation provided in the introductory remarks, I set the variable “X” as the
international system. Significantly, I argued that “X” represented both a dependent and
independent variable. As a dependent variable, the international system has been changed
by a number of developments within international politics. A number of independent
variables – like the end of the Cold War, globalization, and the perception others have
with regard to their place in the international system – alter the way in which the
international system behaves. On the other hand, the international system and its
composition play a large factor in the way states have organized themselves in the
contemporary era. In this case, the international system is an independent variable that
changes the way states behave. We can see this behavior through the emphasis on both
political and economic efforts to liberalize states. In that model, the state becomes the
dependent variable. The duality of this argument comes from the current emphasis on
international politics as a two-level or nested game. In this chapter, I will discuss the
theoretical arguments that consider the international system and the system level as both
dependent and independent variables – or the changes in and changes because of the
international system.
Intuitively, observations of the international political landscape would necessarily
suggest that the composition of the international system has changed and, perhaps, the
way in which that system behaves has changed, as well. The end of the Cold War offers a
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clear illustration of the intuitive suggestion that international politics is somehow
different. The dissolution of the Soviet Union was initially met by a large percentage of
political analysts as an encouraging development in world security. The advantage of
nearly two decades of world events, however, allows the student of international relations
to view the fall of the Soviet Union in more of an historical perspective. Political
analysts posited certain assumptions and beliefs that one can now view in suitable
context. That is, initially, the rapid and multilateral expulsion of Saddam Hussein and
Iraqi forces from Kuwait foreshadowed a promising advancement in world security and
international governance. The United States quickly emerged as the player in
international relations - an uncontested global hegemon in a world that had
unquestionably evolved into a unipolar composition of power.
Be that as it may, world events surfaced to challenge the notion of a New World
Order. Non-state actors in the form of terrorists molested the United States time after
time. Obviously, the record confirms that the United States faced an emerging threat whether the government realized it or not. The assault on the Central Intelligence
Building, the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center, the attacks on U.S. military
installations in Saudi Arabia, the strike on the USS Cole in Yemen, the 1998 embassy
bombings in Tanzania and Kenya, and a series of foiled terror plots from New York to
Los Angeles to Jordan all unfolded in the recently altered international system. 1
Indeed, the Cold War Era unquestionably highlighted times of conflict and even
terror attacks but, ultimately, mechanisms specific to the system kept terror attacks, more
or less, limited to those sponsored by states instead of the more contemporary stateless

1

For a detailed annotated timeline of terror events aimed at the United States please see Peter Lance, 1000
Years for Revenge: International Terrorism and the FBI (New York: Harper Collins, 2003).

7

face of terrorism. The bipolar configuration of the Cold War Era acted as a limiting
dynamic on all forms of conflict. In addition, the Cold War relationships assured
sovereignty of even the states on very unstable political ground and lacking legitimacy to
govern. In the end, the Cold War acted as a reducing factor in transnational conflict as
well as state failure. The threat of global nuclear war deterred theatre-wide warfare and
limited conflicts to wars by proxy. 2 That is, engagements featuring superpower support
of rival factions within a system. As part of the larger picture, the United States and the
Soviet Union often guaranteed the existence of regimes and states that under different
circumstances would fall victim to the laws of natural selection and perhaps join the
ranks of failed states. 3 Indeed, self-interest motivated the Soviet Union and the United
States however, the end result necessarily created a more stable system with less
likelihood of multiple numbers of state failures and constraining mechanisms from
Moscow and Washington.
The fall of the Soviet Union enhanced the probability of state failure. State
failure, I will argue, ultimately leads to an intrastate and interstate vacuum of power and
sovereignty. In addition, non-state actors can fill the vacuity created by a failed state. As
a result, sovereignty previously reserved for state actors now became available to nonstate actors. Political entrepreneurs emerged to take advantage of the lack of organized
political capital locally in failed states and began to claim space within the international

2

Theory developed from J. Herz, The Nation-State and the Crisis of World Politics: Essays on
International Politics in the 20th Century (New York: David McKay and Company, 1976).
3
A good discussion of the forms and causes of state failure can be found in I. William Zartman ed.,
Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne
Rienner Publishers, 1995).
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system. 4 Furthermore, the domain of non-state actors includes what can best be
described as violent non-state actors. Indeed, the attacks of September 11, 2001 on the
World Trade Center and Pentagon certainly illustrated the prospective threat of such
organizations.
In order to complicate matters even more, the fall of the Soviet Union
corresponded with globalization. Although argued effectively in many sources, the idea
of globalization being antecedent to the fall of the Soviet Union represents one beyond
the scope of my effort. Instead, the process of globalization acts in conjunction with the
development of what, I argue, is a much different international system - one including
non-state actors. 5 Globalization can ultimately be viewed as a factor that changed the
international system as well as an independent variable in the increased power of nonstate actor as well as the decreased sovereignty of the state. Indeed, several key
assumptions with regard to International Relations need to be revisited within the context
of contemporary geopolitical relations. In the past, a billiard table metaphorically
explained the conduct of states within the international system. 6 The billiard balls existed
in the context of a larger system – sometimes clashing and other times tenuously coexisting. Yet, the international system – the playing field or billiard table – ultimately
remained a construct and pattern for the billiard balls, the state actors. Spatially, the
dimensions and context of the billiard table fit the needs, requirements, and structure of
the players. In other words, billiards is a one dimensional activity – one that does not
4

The concept of non-state actors as political entrepreneurs emanates from Fiona Buchan Adamson,
Mobilizing the Margins of the System: The Dynamics and Security Impacts of Transnational Mobilization
by Non-State Actors (Columbia University: PhD Dissertation, 2003).
5
See, among others, Colonel Thomas X. Hammes, The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century,
(St. Paul: Zenith Press, 2004) or Martin van Creveld, The Transformation of War, (New York: Free Press,
1991).
6
Analogy from John J. Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions.” International
Security 19 (Winter, 1994-1995): 48.

9

account for the realities of the complexities inherent to the post Cold War Era. Currently,
however, the state actor does not maintain an exclusive monopoly in the formation of the
playing field. That is, non-state actors usurp space and dimensions not defined by the
state actor – to wit, the felt and dimensional space surrounding billiard balls on a table. In
addition, the nature of the non-state actor allows for swift, fluid, and dynamic movement
in order to capitalize on the emerging multidimensional nature of the international system

A Historical Review of International Relations
Necessary to understanding the argument that the international system and its
characteristics have changed, I believe, is a brief discussion of the history and genesis of
the international system as it has been viewed for the last several hundred years. In
reviewing the historical roots and foundations, I hope to demonstrate how politics within
the international system are socially constructed and, as social constructs, susceptible to
international system level changes resulting from social agreements. In other words, if
social agreements define the international structure and its characteristics future social
agreements can certainly redefine the same system.
In common practice, historians regard 1648 as the watershed for international
relations. The year 1648 resulted in the Treaty of Westphalia - effectively ending what is
generally identified as the Thirty Years War - but also fashioning the structure and
fundamentals for what political scientists consider the "modern state." That is, the
emergence of a "state" and state sovereignty supplanted the function of religious
sovereignty in the realm of geopolitical affairs. The state included a definite geographical
territory and assumed the role previously held by the Church as the ultimate authority in
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the international system. Westphalia arranged the notion of sovereignty as one absolute
to the state actor.
Needless to say, state leaders appreciated that Westphalia would never serve as an
all-encompassing "magic wand" ensuring indefinite and open-ended sovereignty. As a
result, the model of permanent militaries coupled to the state began to materialize. The
permanent military could "encourage" - through its mere existence or behavior - other
states and fringe actors to recognize the definitive sovereignty of the state. Ultimately,
Westphalia created an international system of state actors. Moreover, the state actors of
Austria, Russia, England, France, the Netherlands and Belgium managed the structure
until the early nineteenth century.
Westphalia, however, would also exist as a covenant subjected to the whims of
history. By 1815, Napoleon suffered defeat and the Congress of Vienna established a
peace. The Vienna Treaty precipitated the emergence of the Concert of Europe and
dominance by Austria, Britain, France, Prussia, and Russia in the international system. In
order to assure peace, the dominant states of Europe committed to a series of alliances.
The international system showcased coalitions calculated in order to realize a balance of
power - fashioned so that one individual state or arrangement of states did not develop
into too dominant of a geopolitical power. Great Britain, an incredibly dominant
influence, symbolized the embodiment of the balance of power premise. Great Britain
acted as a "balancer" and guaranteed that no other state or alliance emerged as too
powerful within the international system. 7

7

The theory of “offshore balancer” may be found in John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power
Politics (W. W. Norton: New York 2002).
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World War I, however, brought an end to the balance of power system. The
scheme designed to ensure a peace, ironically, ended with a single shot from an assassin's
gun that ultimately led to the deaths of over 10 million people. The assassination of
Archduke Franz Ferdinand at the hands of Gavrilo Princip led to the world's first Great
War. World War I prompted the end of the Russian empire, the Austro - Hungarian
Empire, and the Ottoman Empire. The states of Europe were defeated economically,
politically, and socially. The settlement that ended World War I, the Treaty of Versailles,
left Germany enraged and frustrated. While, on the other hand, the United States
prospered economically as a result of the war. The lucrative trade resulting from World
War I completed the transformation of the United States into a world economic power
and, as a result, a latent world political actor.
World War II unmistakably plunged the United States into the global spotlight.
The United States played the critical role in defeating the fascist axis powers of Germany,
Italy, and Japan. Moreover, a new international relationship emerged at the end of World
War II, the Cold War. The United States and the Soviet Union would fight proxy wars,
contend for neutral states, and stare each other down from 1947 until the fall of the Soviet
Union in the years of 1989 to 1991. During the Cold War Period, foreign policy issues
were most often viewed through the perspective of realism. The realist school of thought
would come to dominate much of the discourse surrounding international relations.
Realists based the conduct of international relations on several key assumptions: the
international system was anarchical, the state was the primary and rational actor, and
states behave in a way that maximizes power. Adherents of the school of realism
included such noted figures as Robert Gilpin, George Kennan, Henry Kissinger, Stephan
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Krasner, Hans Morganthau, Susan Strange, and Kenneth Waltz. 8 The theory and
philosophy of Realism dominated the Cold War Era and filled textbooks on International
Relations and strategic planning sessions of national security experts. In short, realists
argue that the system is fixed and international relations a clear struggle for power within
a system where power rules all. Ironically, the period of the Cold War Era - with nuclear
war a computer keystroke and a turn of a key away - was, many argue, one of the most
peaceful times in modern world history.
The fall of the Soviet Union created yet another new international order. The
international order featured one exclusive hegemon - the United States. The New World
Order appeared to be a most positive development for international relations when a
broad coalition defeated Iraq after its August 1990 invasion of Kuwait. Indeed, as
Francis Fukuyama pointed out, many believed the "end of history" was upon the world. 9
Be that as it may, a contending theory emerged illustrating the ideological underpinnings
of what can best be termed as a "new model" for international relations - Huntington's
Clash of Civilizations. 10 Huntington' argument examines the devolution of the
international system but arrives a vastly different conclusions as applied in terms of a
"new paradigm." Yet, Huntington's work is useful from an epistemic point of view in
analyzing the context of an altered international system.
The Huntington thesis creates - as a vital variable in the progression of the
international system - the role of culture. That said, Huntington reasons that the end of

8

A summary of realism and individual theorists may be found in Martin Griffiths, Fifty Key Thinkers in
International Relations (New York: Routledge, 1999).
9
Fukuyama believed liberal democracy was the last stage in historical development in Francis Fukuyama,
The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Harper Perennial, 1993).
10
Samuel A. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations: Remaking of World Order (New York: Touchstone,
1996).
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the Cold War released the Genie in a bottle - culture - and "global politics began to be
reconfigured along cultural lines.” 11 Furthermore, Huntington asserts, the role of culture
is one that performs on a stage of conflict - in other words, "for peoples seeking identity
and reinventing ethnicity, enemies are essential…" 12 As a result, the "new" model of
international behavior is based upon the ideologies and realities of culture. In addition,
the construction of a culturally based system has, by definition, led to an unstable and a
conflict capable international reality. Within this context, Huntington outlines the sudden
shift to a multipolar and multicivilizational world. 13 Indeed, the end result of such a
geopolitical structure is the increased likelihood of conflict based upon reinforced
cultural cleavages. Although oft criticized by political scientists in the United States, the
Huntington thesis offers an important hypothesis with regard to the behavior of the
international system – it was no longer solely state driven but driven by culture at some
level. Again, whether one agrees with the prominent position Huntington gives to culture
or not, the key bit of discovery is the argument that the nature of the international system
has changed because the nature of the actors had changed. Once again, referring to the
equations introduced in chapter one, a change in the international system yields more
powerful non-state actors (or: ΔX + Y = Z). Previously, the argument concerning culture
typically was a state-centered argument. For example, can a predominantly Catholic state
form an effective democracy or are Asian values parallel with the values of a democracy.
Using Huntington’s model culture now makes a difference in the international system. In
the case study that follows, one can see how the Muslim Brotherhood effectively played

11

Ibid., p.19.
Ibid., p. 20.
13
Ibid., p.21.
12
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the culture card in local areas of Egypt, Jordan, and other states. Yet, it is not until groups
like al-Qaeda that culture matters within the larger domain of the international system.
The use of Huntington’s work is helpful in that he offers a series of alternative
hypothesis for his argument that conduct within the international system has changed. A
quick discussion of each of the alternative hypotheses reduces Huntington’s argument to
the critical notion that observations of international politics after the fall of the Soviet
Union clearly indicates that something is different. Although deemed problematic
approaches by Huntington, the alternative suppositions are useful in following the
development of Huntington's philosophy. Specifically, Huntington attempts to counter
theories coined "one world euphoria and harmony," "two worlds us and them," "184
states, more or less," and "sheer chaos.” 14 Each alternative hypothesis offers logical
explanations for the reality of global power politics after the fall of the Soviet Union.
But, for the importance of this effort, each argument offers an hypothesis on why the
international system is different than before.
With that in mind, I wish to explore the Huntington notion of the "sheer chaos"
paradigm. Huntington uses "sheer chaos" in an effort to identify those that point to
international conditions suggesting a "breakdown of government authority" and "the
breakup of states.” 15 Ultimately, the resulting landscape permits "the intensification of
tribal, ethnic, and religious conflict; the emergence of international criminal mafias” and
the substantial complications of additional numbers of refugees, the increased
accessibility of weapons of mass destruction, the "spread of terrorism," and further

14
15

Ibid., p.32-36.
Ibid.
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occasions of "massacres and ethnic cleansing.” 16 The definitional dilemma, as indicated
by Huntington, with regards to chaos theory is the presence of substantial mechanisms
remaining to ensure order. Thus, Huntington submits, sheer chaos does not precisely
explicate existing world politics. With all due deference to Dr. Huntington, the notion of
“sheer chaos” merely edited to “chaos” indicates a fairly realistic depiction of the
international system. Indeed, mechanisms do, in fact, remain to ensure international order
but those mechanisms more clearly belong within the domain of power politics. The
Realist notion of an international system run by the exercise of actual and latent threats of
power now includes emerging actors – non-state actors - somewhat immune to traditional
manifestations of state power primarily due to their positioning within the international
political system. Finally, one must necessarily view international power politics as a zerosum endeavor. As non-state actors assume roles traditionally monopolies of state actors
then the overall net power of state actors is reduced.
In an effort to set aside the realist claim of "184 states more or less" Huntington
expresses the problematic methodology of merely relying on the state actor as the solitary
dimension of geo-political relations. Albeit "…states remain the primary actors in world
affairs, they are also suffering losses in sovereignty, function, and power.” 17 Thus, the
state no longer occupies the lone place at the international table. Instead, "International
institutions have assumed important functions previously performed by states…" 18
Needless to say, the emerging non-state institutions play a significant factor in the
evolving international system.

16

Ibid., p.35.
Ibid.
18
Ibid.
17
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Huntington supposes that models of conduct, for a variety of explanations, will be
based upon civilization fractures. Furthermore, Huntington reasons that civilization and
population are actively involved in each other's formation. In other words, the basic idea
of identifying oneself with a civilization is a functional attempt on the individual's part to
identify a place in the geopolitical milieu - whether the individual realizes it or not. As a
result, the effort to define relations in terms of civilizations appears, at some level, a
strained relationship or, at the very least, an unnaturally occurring operation of the system
but an active effort, on behalf of individuals, to redefine political realities. As a result,
the difficulty in applying the theories of Huntington, in many ways, fails to recognize the
deeper and more composite nature of the international system. With that in mind, the
Huntington thesis is appropriate to examine as a lucid illustration of the disposition of the
evolving international system.
Huntington's examination also allows for the employment of trends and statistics
that pertain to the larger picture of international relations. For example, Huntington
points to the increase of organized religions, in a global sense, in the late 20th century:
"That resurgence has involved the intensification of religious consciousness and the rise
of fundamentalist movement. It has thus reinforced the differences among religions.” 19
Significantly, if the basic percentages of adherents to each traditional religion are unable
to adapt to the requirements of modernization, the potential exists for the spread of
Western Christianity and Islam. 20 In most cases, Islam wins a confrontation between
Christianity and Islam - Huntington argues where Christianity converts Islam converts

19
20

Ibid., p.64.
Ibid., p.65.
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and reproduces. 21 Thus, demographic data supports the conclusion that Muslim birthrates
threaten the balance of population. In this context, Huntington argues the "clash of
civilizations" and contends religion operates as a principal factor of what defines a
civilization. Once again, however, the unstated result is a continued decay in the structure
of the state and an increase in the power and influence of non-state actors often in the
form of transnational ideologies. In this case, the international system has changed in that
the state is no longer the unitary actor. Discussion, in a later chapter, will follow the
notion of a decaying state and apply it to the state level of analysis. For the purposes of
Huntington, however, the significance is at the system level. What this argument
confirms is the initial equation and the argument that a change in the system has led to
more powerful non-state actors.
Worthy of note to the Huntington thesis is the challenge of the liberal
institutionalist precept that increased trade and contact between cultures or states likely
will reduce conflict. Huntington calls the conclusions of such studies into doubt and, at
the same time, uses the psychological themes of distinctiveness theory to suggest that
increased interaction actually results in the likelihood of conflict. 22 Simply put, the more
interaction peoples have the higher the likelihood of conflict of some variety - based on
civilization variations and their predictable impact. In fact, people characterize
themselves as to what they are not and, when applied in the context of international
relations, the exclusive definitional act enhances the opportunities for reinforced cleavage
as well as increasing the possibility for some form of difference of opinion. 23 In short,
Huntington cautions that globalization will likely enhance opportunities for conflict. Yet,
21

Ibid.
Ibid., p.67.
23
Ibid.
22
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once again, the argument certainly does not limit conflict to state actors alone. In fact,
Huntington cites Roland Robertson as to the impact of globalization in global
relationships - "… in an increasingly globalized world - characterized by historically
exceptional degrees of civilizational, societal, and other modes of interdependence and
widespread consciousness thereof - there is an exacerbation of civilizational, societal, and
ethnic self-consciousness" and that the reemergence of religion is a reaction to the forces
that define the world as but a single concept. 24 Ultimately, Huntington’s premise
illustrates a dynamic global system with numerous allusions to the increasing
significance of non-state actors. In addition, the Huntington system argues that occasions
of conflict likely will increase. Again, the argument of increased conflicts as a result of
increased levels of trade and globalization reflect an overall change in the international
system which, as I have argued, leads to increased opportunities for the non-state actor to
usurp additional power. In fact, such a conclusion resembles the focus of this paper –
although many of the systemic arguments differ considerably. The familiar realist
typology of actors in the international system as states behaving rationally in order to
maximize power does not accurately reflect the reality of existing geopolitical exigencies.
In addition, the hierarchical study of levels of interaction - system, state, and individual
inputs - falls short in reflecting the exigency of current global power interactions. This
paper will attempt to introduce and operationalize a more appropriate précis of the
modern international political system.
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The Increased Role of the Non-State Actor
Part of the changing international system is the dynamic that the state is no longer the
sole source of inputs into international politics. Indeed, non-state actors have significantly
operated for many decades. For the most part, however, such organizations exerted power
only within specific state areas – as will be clear with the Muslim Brotherhood – or were
complimentary to the state actor and policy preferences of state actors. For example,
efforts to restrict naval enlargement with the Washington Conference in the 1920s were
virtually ignored by all signatories – including the United States. The international
organization has come a long way since the Washington Naval Conferences even
representing independent expressions of power in the form of an ability to punish
defectors within international regimes. Be that as it may, the contemporary record is
replete with other non-state actors exercising power in the international system. Multinational corporations, terrorist groups, and a number of other non-governmental
organizations all play significant roles within the contemporary international system.
Clearly, a key aspect of the evolution of the international system consists of the
behavior of the individual state actor within that system. In short, the state actor no
longer behaves in a unitary fashion. As argued, other units have the ability and freedom
to act within the larger picture of the international system. The concept of states as the
sole actor in the international system simply no longer applies. 25 It is this change in the
international system that allows for non-state actors to increase their power. Actors of all
sorts behave in the same manner as states. For example, non-government organizations
often flex a sufficient amount of influence to adjust policy at grand levels. Indeed, the
25
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international attempt to ban landmines offers an outstanding example of a grassroots
organization playing the game at the global plane. 26 Certainly, corporations often carry
the financial and political clout to engage in policy formulation at the international level
and even boast their own security apparatus in order to protect corporate interests.
"Dollar diplomacy" does not necessarily require the overt involvement of a government
actor. Specifically, the non-state actor no longer is subjected to the limiting action of
state actors upon their conduct. The system based upon states as unitary actors has given
way to a system of numerous actors including emergence of the non-state actor.
Recent research documents the modification of the state-centered system in varied
degrees. Laura Neack contends that "as the twentieth century gave way to the twentyfirst, a distinct global society had become a permanent feature of the international
System.” 27 As such, Neack compares the global society to the street life of Bangkok,
Thailand. 28 Interaction no longer merely exists in simple terms. Instead, different levels
of social, economic, and political classes interact in different ways and for varied goals.
Simply, the metaphor claims that life in the global system - much like life in Bangkok exists on many levels of interaction. Clearly, Neack's comparison reveals that the
primacy of states in the international system has yielded to altered arrangements featuring
the interaction of various actors. In fact, Neack presents a fresh understanding of global
society as “a many-layered superstructure” that includes “states, international lending
institutions, multinational corporations, intergovernmental organizations of many types,
nongovernment actors …, armies-for-hire and private security firms and just regular
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people…” 29 Certainly, Neack concludes that the international system features infinitely
more complexities than in times past.
In addition, the system is further evolving with the phenomenon of state actors as
impotent and ineffective with regard to action in some of the varied responsibilities
inherent to the definition of state. Neack argues "as the twentieth century started to close,
it became clear that many over-extended states were not able to provide basic services
like law and order…" and "the loss of exclusive territorial control to be a feature of all
states in this era of globalization.” 30 Thus, the role of state in the domestic sense appears
dynamic and changing. 31 But also, states fail to operate with a unitary voice within the
international system because they have difficulty achieving a monopoly of politics within
their own territory.
The changing nature of the state threatens the domestic political arrangements
within the state. Neack cites recent scholarship from Ronnie Lipschutz contending "that
the growth of transnational forces and processes are rendering the nation-state
increasingly permeable to all kinds of flows, ideas, and behaviors.”32 That is, the very
essence of the state within the international system is shifting and facing new challenges.
In short, the state clearly is not the same unchallenged actor found in the substance of
international politics of eras past. Furthermore, Lipschutz argues the altered system will
have a long-term impact on the concepts of both "citizens" and "citizenship." Clearly,
Lipschutz contends the relationship of citizen and citizenship applies only in the notion of
statehood. As a result, an alteration in the primacy of states will create a vacuum in the
29
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concept of citizenship that may be filled by the emergence of other actors. In that
context, Lipschutz argues one of three scenarios is most likely for the replacement of
state roles in citizenship - "a global civil society, counter-hegemonic social movements,
and partially deterritorialized political communities.” 33 Or, simply, the failure of states to
provide unitary national and international standing allows the emergence of non-state
actors within the larger system. The non-state actor may then capitalize on functions of
the state and the corresponding latent political capital.
In addition, the dynamic of the government - by definition - leads to a change in
the substance of the governed. Neack notes "in the absence of alternative modes of
citizenship and because of globalization's assault on traditional national identities, we
might expect some recurrence to more fundamentalist identities and nationalism.” 34
Allaine Cerwonda's Constructed Geographies: Redefining National Identity and
Geography in a Shifting International Landscape, according to Neack, argues the
grassroots level of the development of such a new identity. Non-state actors have long
played a role in the international system. That said, however, the application of the
realist assumptions and paradigms largely explained interaction on a grand systemic
level. The balance of power, struggle for gains in a zero-sum environment and the
primacy of state actors all existed within the context of the realist model because nonstate actors worked, primarily, as extensions of state actors. Thus, the non-state entity
behaved in a manner often prescribed by their state sponsors. However, the emerging
international paradigm allows for political entrepreneurs in the form of non-state
organizations to construct political capital similar to that of a state actor. Lipschutz,
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Cerwonda, and Neack can all be reduced to one common denominator – changes in the
makeup of the state. As argued in the introduction, it is the changes in the state that lead
to a re-ordering of the international system. As the initial equation illustrates, changes in
the state and/or international system have given the opportunities for non-state actors to
increase their power at both the system and state levels.
Indeed, the international system has evolved into one where non-state actors
potentially fit many of the roles primarily used by state actors. Clearly, the "new" form
of non-state actor is able to behave in a manner that allows for the co-opting of a host of
benefits heretofore reserved for states in the international system. Yet, at the same time,
the non-state actor is becoming more characterized by its refusal to account for and
recognize the cultural and legal norms of state actors. In addition, factors inherent to
globalization have created security and political exigencies beneficial to the growth of
transnational movements. Finally, the manner and structure of the contemporary nonstate actor allows those committed at challenging the international system to act
asymmetrically. From a security perspective, the asymmetric threat is one that can best
be summarized as a "force multiplier." To wit, the very threat of a non-state actor
engaging in asymmetric forms of warfare multiplies the actual and potential damage from
such an attack. Indeed, all of this can be accomplished without many of the traditional
financial and political costs inherent to governance at a central level. In simple terms,
non-state actors have increased their power relative to the state and, quite often, perform
state functions but do not face the same costs and limitations of the state.
Thus, the realist model, so commonly used during the Cold War Era to explain
international relations, needs to be altered. A contemporary evolution of realism must
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account for the "new" role of non-state actors. Indeed, the asymmetrical threat of such
actors makes them a clear security concern toward the stability of the entire international
system. Furthermore, the analysts of international security must account for non-state
actors within the paradigm and precepts of power maximization - but through asymmetric
means.
First, from the point of view of hierarchical structures inherent to the global
political environment, states have been perceived as the central actor in the international
system with some degree of limitations implemented from intrastate actors. That is,
certain interest groups or political organizations may play a part in the inputs that lead to
a state’s policy formation. However, the information age and globalization both have
altered many of the fundamental systemic characteristics of political relationships. As a
result, the heretofore-internal elements of policy input have essentially engaged in policy
inputs at the international systemic level.
For example, organizations similar to Greenpeace and Amnesty International
presently labor to effect modifications in the functions of the international system.
Indeed, Greenpeace works for environmental change in the international system and not
only adjustments in the policies of specific state actors. Hence, the international system
now includes the functioning of transnational movements - like Greenpeace. Many of the
transnational movements may, indeed, be devoted to noble ends. However, the danger of
a normative view of such organizations is in minimizing their role as policy inputs in the
international system. Greenpeace, once normative assumptions are abandoned, is nothing
more than an actor in the international system attempting to maximize gains in order to
achieve a predefined goal. Thus, organizations function toward "ends" much like state
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actors. Whereas Greenpeace attempts to maximize gains in order to address the global
environment, individual states act in a manner that maximizes power. The process in
both cases is analogous - both organizations as well as state actors conduct themselves in
such a way as to attempt to wield power in the structure of a zero-sum power
relationship. The advantage of a non-state actor, however, lies in its ability to use the
system itself as an ally. Thus, state actors are often constrained or limited while “working
within the system.” On the other hand, non-state actors possess a unique ability and
structure that allows for a “working of the system.” Ultimately, the notions of legitimacy
and effectiveness affix boundaries for both actors. Clearly, the non-state actor possesses a
clear advantage in that it may construct its own identity and, therefore, its own basis for
legitimacy and effectiveness. Conversely, a state actor must amass effectiveness and
legitimacy within the context of “state” dating back to the 17th Century. Furthermore, the
non-state actor can behave and act on the basis of current – and even predicted – notions
of effectiveness and legitimacy. Ultimately, however, non-state actors and state actors
both utilize political power in order to achieve a goal of some sort.
The basic assumption of the state as a unitary actor within the realities of
arrangements of international security faces a challenge from academics and researchers,
as well. In fact, Adamson suggests that post Cold War international relations are very
much outside of the defining characteristics of traditional assumptions. That is, Adamson
suggests that recent conflicts such as Kosovo, East Timor, Bosnia, and Rwanda cannot be
explained by the traditional models of international relations and, as a result, sentenced to
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the growing list of "unexplainable" events in international discourse. 35 In addition,
Adamson suggests that local conflicts may not necessarily be strictly local conflicts but
instead feature further spatial dimensions. As a result, the operational definition of local
conflict must be exactingly outlined in order to account for the growing number of what
heretofore can best be described as "local conflicts" that actually consist of multiple
dimensions often in multiple systems. The advent of a globalized world theatre allows
for a broadening of all conflicts. For example, an interested Palestinian living in New
York City merely needs to log on the internet in order to find a multitude of ways in
assisting in the Intifada. In addition, the presence of large diasporas makes a conflict
stressing civilization-based cleavages international by definition. Clearly, the universe of
previously held definitions of conflict - "internal conflicts," "civil wars," and "ethnic
conflicts" need to be revisited and closely examined in order to reflect contemporary
reality. Adamson argues - in many cases - the conflicts seen as "spatially bounded" are in
fact transnational in scope. Thus, the idea of internal conflict or civil war or ethnic
conflict is not universally reduced to a sub-international system activity. Instead, analysts
must be prepared to view such conflicts through the prism of the international system in
order to fully appreciate the context of such disputes. In the contemporary globalized
international system very local conflicts threaten to morph into international disputes.
Again, these observations return to the basic premise that the international system and
behavior observed has fundamentally changed.
Indeed, Adamson effectively notes that many of the post Cold War conflicts that
have been labeled as "internal" actually operate on the transnational level. The so-called
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"internal conflicts" operating in the transnational level - in addition - often features
behavior by a non-state actor. Thus, Kosovo, East Timor, Sri Lanka, Kashmir, Nagorno Karabakh, Chechnya, and Northern Ireland are simple more than "internal conflicts."
Instead, many of the conflicts within state actors are mobilized transnationally "Transnational mobilization is a strategy employed by relatively weak actors in the
international system as a means of consolidating spatially diffuse resources for the
purpose of converting them into a coherent projection of political power." 36 Thus,
transnational mobilization, according to Adamson, is completed by what can best be
named "political entrepreneurs" - those that discover and take advantage of political
realities in order to advance a specific end.
Once a "political entrepreneur" identifies an exploitable political reality a process
of political mobilization commences. Adamson suggests that transnational mobilization is
engaged in three different ways. That is, the non-state actor may first attempt to
construct an "identity category," then pursue the "harnessing of dispersed material
resources" available in the international system, and, finally, engage in a process of
"international mobilization of political support." 37 As a result, the sub-state actor, many
times very weak at the state level, gains legitimacy in the international system. Moreover,
a stronger international unit translates into increased domestic influence. A cycle of selfsustained growth allows for multi-dimensional expansion of political power. The
mobilization of political power is accomplished not from an elitist perspective of top
down but instead, from the bottom up grass roots level. As mobilization succeeds and
political capital is gained, Adamson argues, the non-state actor becomes a player in the
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security issues of "various levels" of the international system. As a result, the non-state
actor may work at the local level, state level, or international level. All levels then
become “penetrated” by the non-state actor. Also, the non-state actor emerges as a
politically asymmetric threat. Indeed, the non-state actor may manipulate any level of
interaction that is politically advantageous - it is fast and dynamic. The state actor
remains burdensome and slow and can only react to the non-state actor. The speed and
agility of the non-state actor clearly adds to its ability to build political capital and
impinge on the sovereignty of states.
Clearly, the impact of a non-state actor varies in the strength and number of the
actor's dimensions. To illustrate, the international jihadist movement - as a political
entrepreneur - attempts to garner political capital through a variety of constructed
"identity categories" that include anti-globalization feelings, anti-Israeli sentiment, anti American feelings, pro-Islamic doctrine, levels of shared ethnic heritage, categories of
economic inequality, as well as a host of basic psychological and emotional needs. The
jihadist movement, in essence, has constructed a series of "shared beliefs" in order to
build a very influential non-state actor. Building upon my initial hypothesis, I also
maintain that the perceived view of oneself within the international system acts as a
variable in altering the system – at both the system and state levels.
The development of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) provides an outstanding
example of the evolution of power by non-state actors acting as political entrepreneurs.
The KLA was formed in Switzerland in 1996 and used broadcasts throughout Europe in
order to lead political campaigns. In essence, the fall of Albania allowed the KLA to arm
by obtaining Albanian weapons and began a systematic program of military training.
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Next, funds and recruits were collected throughout Diaspora communities of Europe in
order to feed the KLA. At the same time, the KLA took advantage of existing
international criminal organizations in order to fund activities. As Adamson argues, the
non-state actor is able to operate cross the political systems.
As the structure and actors of the international system change, “new”
relationships and altered levels of interaction emerge. Muhittin Ataman argues the
international system is one of three levels and defined by the "growth of so many kinds of
non-state actors" that challenge and weaken "the state - centric concept of international
politics” and result in the creation of a system more “transnational” in character. 38 The
model presented by Ataman holds transnational factors clearly become a “threat and a
challenge to states, and hence influence foreign policy decision - making in almost all
countries.” 39 Furthermore, the traditional view of the international system as one of two
levels of interaction - domestic and external - need to reflect the growth of a transnational
third level. In fact, the "transnational ideologies emerged at the end of the socialist bloc
(fundamentalist and radical movements) are considered as a significant issue for many
states around the world.” 40 In addition, the emerging ideologies have usurped the
behavioral characteristics of the transnational movements. 41 Once again, the modus
operandi of the transnational movements suggests an evolving asymmetric quality. The
usual method employed by non-state actors of targeting domestic instead of external
goals is now anarchistic; the contemporary non-state structure is more concerned with
ideology. As ideology emerged as the dominant model, the non-state actor could take
38
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advantage of the fixed dynamics of external versus domestic in the minds of politicians
and policy makers. Ataman’s transnational ideology fits the overall argument concerning
increased powers of non-state actors. The only difference is that Ataman constructs a new
level – the transnational level – where I maintain that the transnational inputs are able to
simply permeate the system and state. Moreover, the construction of the “transnational
factors” are asymmetric social arrangements and do not strictly confine themselves to the
traditional hierarchical view of international politics.
Given the theoretical advancement that non-state actors do operate within the
global political system, one must analyze and adopt a grand level theory for the behavior
of the non-state actor. To be sure, another key characteristic of the non-state actor intent
on the adoption of the use of violence is the force multiplier advantage inherent to
asymmetrical warfare - combat out side the domain of traditional conflict. As applied to
the United States, the notion of asymmetric warfare is best defined as "unconventional
approaches that avoid or undermine our strengths while exploiting our vulnerabilities.” 42
From an historical perspective, asymmetric warfare alludes to the Roman Consul Fabius
Maximum who notable defended Rome from Hannibal and the Carthaginians. Fabius
engaged a strategy of evasion - due to superior Carthaginian forces - and, at the same
time, directed evasion as a technique to impact enemy morale. As a result, Fabius
lengthened and "protracted the war" against Hannibal with the use of "military pin-pricks
to wear down the invaders' endurance" in a form of classical asymmetric warfare. 43
Accepting Carl von Clausewitz’s argument that war is politics by other means, one may
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also extend the concept of asymmetric warfare to a broader theory of asymmetric
geopolitical behavior. Conceptually, if war exists within political behavior it then follows
that politics may be expressed by warfare. In turn, asymmetric warfare can be reduced to
a more general notion of asymmetric global politics. Thus, a non-state actor engaged in
asymmetric politics may resort to any political activity that “undermines our strengths
while exploiting our vulnerabilities.” In modern terms, many of the newly empowered
non-state actors are able to use coercion methods more potent than traditional capacities
with the added element of asymmetry. Within this arrangement, globalization and the
information age have acted to restrict the array of behaviors acceptable in warfare by
state actors. Thus, non-state actors have a wider collection of options that traditional
state actors are not prepared to either engage in or deter. That is, the pure aggregate
number of options is limited by societal constraints placed upon state actors. Non-state
actors involved in the struggle for geopolitical power are limited only by norms of
behavior placed by member participants and any external sources of funding. That said,
the norms that apply to non-state actors have broadened due to the evolution of the nonstate structure within the context of globalization.
Assuming the position that non-state actors now behave in the same relative
power paradigm as state actors, the pertinent question is how do such non-state actors
behave - that is, do non-state actors in the international system behave as rational actors
or in some other manner? Contemporary literature offers a variety of behavior models
useful in the prediction of future outcomes based upon the behavior of non-state actors.
One such useful alternative is the concept of prospect theory. In short, prospect theory
suggests that actors are risk adverse in times of gains and risk seeking in the domain of
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losses. 44 So, in a generic sense, those sitting on top of the system tend to be more
conservative while those in a disadvantageous position have a tendency to act more
aggressively. As a result, the behavior of such non-state actors can be viewed through
the useful prism of prospect theory. The non-state actors active in the "new" international
paradigm gain popular legitimacy toward their movement by targeting the dispossessed
and disaffected. Thus, the entity operates globally in a domain of losses. According to
prospect theory, analysts can predict that behavior will be risk seeking. In a practical
sense, the popular following of terror groups like HAMAS and Hezbollah can be reduced
to the least common denominator - individuals feel that they have no other choice but to
resort to asymmetric political behavior. An application of prospect theory maintains
members of HAMAS, Hezbollah, and other radical movements behave aggressively due
to their constituency’s subordinate position – imagined or real - within the international
system. 45
The study of security and security enhancement fulfill a significant and important
practical application in the field of International Relations and politics. Within this
context, John Downey speaks of the changing of relationships in the international
system. 46 Indeed, Downey believes that the current wave of "international terrorism and
our reactions could aggregate into a prolonged revolutionary epoch sustained by the
under-privileged against the over-privileged in order to force the latter to face up to the
44

Prospect theory is often viewed as a cognitive approach to international relations and a competing theory
with the realist assumptions of rational actor theory. For a detailed discussion please see Andrew Farkas,
“Evolutionary Models in Foreign Policy Analysis,” International Studies Quarterly 40 (1996): 343-361.
45
How a specific actor may perceive actions in the international system has been a growing portion of the
literature in foreign policy studies. A detailed discussion may be found in Alexander L. George, “The
‘Operational Code:’ A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision Making,”
International Studies Quarterly 13 (1969): 190-222. Another widely cited source is R. Herrmann, “The
Empirical Challenge of the Cognitive Revolution: A Strategy for Drawing Inferences About Perceptions,”
International Studies Quarterly 32 (1988): 175-203.
46
See John Downey, “Third World Versus the West,” Open Democracy, August 21, 2002.

33

world's growing inequalities.” 47 As a result, Downey argues that behavior in the
international system can no longer only be ruled by force and the threat of force. In fact,
actors need to be "…politically inventive in removing the grounds for extremism.” 48 In
other words, one may successfully argue that the nature of the threats facing the
international system calls for asymmetric responses. Furthermore, the call for
asymmetric strategies is revealing in that it recognizes the role of the non-state actor in
the international system. Pure brute power politics, according to this argument, may not
be enough to dominate the international system. In creating a strategy to deal with the
non-state actor, powerful states recognize the presence of the non-state actor in the
system and, as a result, define the system in that manner. For example, the United States
countered the asymmetric nature of the Taliban and al-Qaeda in the war in Afghanistan
through the use of large numbers of Special Forces in place of the conventional war
envisioned by many in the military hierarchy. The Afghan model of fighting an entire
war successfully on the backs of a small number of Special Forces units represented a
dominant use of conflict assets against asymmetric threats. Theoretically, the asymmetric
responses are the counter to the asymmetric threats that have developed. Furthermore,
Downey argues that the conflicts and cleavages in the world society are mainly the
domain of the "haves" versus the "have nots." Downey’s argument returns us to the
initial supposition that a key difference in the international system is that people perceive
their place in that system differently than before. Indeed, the new perceived position has
added to the power of the non-state actor. In addition to the economic inequalities, the
world of geopolitics is further complicated with the existence of ethnic and/or religious
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cleavages. Within the geopolitical reality argued by Downey, the industrial states are
under attack not by the developing states but by groups from the so-called developing
states. That said, "there is no question of the South being able to sustain conventional
warfare against the North, but the level and persistence of the terrorist threat depends a
greet deal, paradoxically, on the Northern response and the reaction in turn in the South,
hence aggression.” 49 To complicate matters further, the growing number and scope of
attacks toward the North will directly relate to increased pressure from Northern domestic
groups for significant and escalated responses. Downey points out the fact that military
analysts are coming full circle with security tactics. That is, the previous belief and
reliance on deterrence has been clearly replaced with a belief in preemption – a crystal
clear change in the international system. Hence, from an epistemic point of view, the
change in defense tactics reflects an overall change in the realities of the international
security system. In addition, Downey suggests that it really only is just a matter of time
before terrorists acquire nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons. Thus, he sketches a
picture of a very active and very dangerous international system – in addition to a very
different international system. The relative willingness of non-state actors from the
South to engage the North in warfare will almost certainly lead to a nuclear, biological, or
chemical attack which would violate nearly universal constraints of the Cold War
international system concerning their use. That said, the use of troops and search and
destroy alone will not eliminate the threat of terrorism. Instead, Downey suggests, the
North must undergo a parallel strategy of economic reform with the military strategy.
System level deterrence will give way, at least partially, to asymmetric strategies
designed at facing the new actors within the system.
49
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Political science and international systems analysis, much like any domain of
epistemic knowledge, often features the presence of theories and phrases both overused
and misused by academics and others eager to define the proper context of the newest
"catch phrase." With that said, the notion of asymmetric warfare is one that has become a
part of the everyday discourse of political analysts. However, part of the difficulty
inherent to asymmetry is the effort to define what asymmetric warfare actually is - or in
the parlance of analysts - a definitional model to explain the boundaries of asymmetric
warfare. Such an effort, however, is a normative exercise. To explain, most military
confrontations are of an asymmetric nature. Opponents attempt to exploit the weakness
of their adversaries while at the same time taking advantage of their own strengths. Be
that as it may, states typically operated within a defined international system - itself a
limiting factor in the use of asymmetry. Yet, the point of my explanation is to reveal a
shift toward an asymmetrical international system. Operationally, the theoretical hair I
am splitting is that, in fact, the asymmetry inherent and characteristic of warfare among
states is in the process of being preempted by a relationship that features a state actor
versus a non-state actor. As a result, the state actor operates under the international
system familiar to the world since the Westphalian era. The non-state actor, on the other
hand, operates independent of many of the constraints facing the state actors. Asymmetry
must not be limited to warfare but, instead, must expand in order to account for political
behavior of all sorts. Thus, the realist model of states competing in a balance of power
arrangement needs drastic alteration in order to depict the struggle between the familiar
state system models versus the "new" reality that features what can best be described as a
"clash of models." The fall of the Soviet Union replaced a predictable political model
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with a dynamic and fluid series of models. Furthermore, the non-state actor utilizes
asymmetric political strategies in order to realize political power and capital in the
international system.

Power in the International System
An example of the evolving nature of the international system is the method and actors
that are able to exercise power over others in the international system. Once again, we
return to the initial set of equations were we find that the changes in the international
system have led to more power for non-state actors. A very clear example of this is in the
study of the exercise of power at the system level. Typically, an international use of hard
power was a policy option for the state but that characteristic of the international system
is changing.
In a garden-variety textbook sense, power can be characterized as the ability to
compel another to act in a specific manner - persuasion. 50 At the highest level, this
struggle for power is played in an international geopolitical theatre. And, furthermore,
the method of persuasion is one that may change from actor to ends to means. In purely
classical terms, persuasion, according to Aristotle, assumed the form of both artistic and
inartistic proofs. 51 The artistic proof is persuasion using the tools of rhetoric while the
inartistic proof is the use of force to compel. In more modern terms, Joseph Nye has cited
both soft and hard power as key in the effort to influence within the international
50
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system. 52 That means of persuasion is much the same and simply boils down to
convincing another to acquiesce via rhetorical discourse or the use of might and muscle.
In the end, what segregates Greenpeace or Amnesty International from other actors is the
lack of employing inartistic means or hard power (although even this is changing as
NGO's are adopting more aggressive rhetorical strategies – for example, the Ecoterrorists in the U.S.). Surely, an organization may effect a conscious determination to
not use such means of inducing action, or such a tactic may be a simple reality of
organization’s structure. As a result, the international system has historically featured the
monopoly of state actors - those with the ability to advocate through both artistic proofs
and inartistic proofs. Hence, organizations - or movements - have existed outside of the
power struggle inherent to international relations. That characteristic of the international
system, however, is changing.
As the system of international relations and conduct has evolved, the role of nonstate actors using hard power and inartistic proofs has emerged as an element of the zero sum global struggle. Organizations using hard power methods in order to oblige a
behavior are typically those of militant, criminal, or terrorist nature. The key variables in
the promotion of such radical elements have been globalization and the information
revolution. As such, the days of radical groups assembling in concealed locations in the
middle of the night have been usurped by the internet and the processes of instant global
communications in the form of satellite phones, blackberries, web pages, and fax
machines. Thus, the non-state actor has made the transition from one of the many input
elements involved in decision making at the state level to often becoming its own entity
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in the international system. Previously, most non-state actors flexed hard power muscle
on merely a state or regional scale or were simply part and parcel of the inputs that
determined policy. Terror groups were relatively geographically confined, and even cells
of terrorist organizations felt pressures of geographical constraint. However, the global
information age has made possible a more centralized command function for non-state
actors while, at the same time, allowing a broader and more geographically disparate
audience of followers.
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Chapter Three
The State
The overall argument of this paper, outlined in chapter one, was that in addition to
changes in the international system, changes in the dynamics of the state have led to
opportunities for non-state actors to become more powerful. The original equations
included X + ΔY and ΔX + ΔY as yielding Z, more powerful non-state actors, when X is
the international system and Y the state. As a result, an emphasis on the state and how the
state acts offers explanatory power and rich description of the characteristics of the
evolving international system.
The non-state actor has emerged as a clear competitor to the concept of state in
many states across the world. For example, Max Manwaring's case study of the activity
of non-state actors in Colombia analyzes the potential threats such organizations pose to
the regional political and security system and also the threat non-state actors pose to the
Colombian government. Manwaring views the growth of terrorism as an outgrowth of the
engagement of non-state actors in contemporary security exigencies. In fact, terrorism
emerges as a practical behavior for some non-state actors who are unable to otherwise
compete with the state for sovereignty. It is terrorism that allows for the non-state actor
to challenge the unitary position of the state and can be viewed as a response to that same
unitary behavior of the state. Furthermore, non-state actors operate in an environment
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allowing for organizational growth and “freedom of movement and action over time.” 53
Finally, as the instability and violence increases the so-called “freedom of movement and
action” expands at the expense of the state’s power. 54
Non-state actors, once constrained by state sovereignty, can now behave without
the scores of constraints encountered by states and in a manner that advances the
sovereignty of their own organization at the expense of the sovereignty of the state.
Reduced power, effectiveness, and legitimacy of the state allow for the non-state actor to
usurp more power. A case study of Colombian insurgent and terror movements
specifically details the evolutionary tract of organizations challenging the state’s
authority. Within this emerging political system, Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionaries di
Colombia (FARC) has advanced with "narco cosmetic patronage of the poor, creation of
their own electoral machinery, participation openly in traditional political parties, and
financing of election campaigns…" 55 Thus, the end goal of FARC is "the intent to
liberate and mobilize the 'disaffected and the dispossessed' population into an alternative
society.” 56 Of course, the "alternative society" is one based upon the visions of FARC
and not of the Colombian government. In essence, FARC has taken advantage of the
political power inherent to a sovereign organization. The state of Colombia no longer
can frame issues without competition from FARC. An international trend emerged of
"…narco - insurgent paramilitary alliance [and] are straightforward. They are
accumulation of wealth, control of territory and people, freedom of movement and action
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and legitimacy.” 57 In the end, the alliance of the narcotics and paramilitary merged and
"together the alliance has the economic and military power equal to or better than most
nation-states.” 58 Finally, although "many academicians are accustomed to thinking of
non-state actors as bit players on a local stage" the "non-state criminal terrorist
organizations … [have become] significant political actors with the ability to compromise
the integrity and sovereignty of individual nation – states.” 59 The power reserved for
states – from arrangements of state sovereignty - revert to the non-state actor. In many
ways, the centralization of power inherent to Westphalia no longer is a guarantee. Thus,
the non-state actor fills the void in sovereignty and advances its own agenda with the
assistance of new-found political capital.

The Historical Role of the State as a Unitary Actor
As with the international system, a quick examination of the historical role of the state as
a unitary actor will provide an interesting and useful study on how the state emerged as
an actor and how the status of the state has been increasingly challenged. The challenge
states face offer additional variables in the general equation introduced in chapter one. In
this case, the changes in the definition and social agreements that create what is known as
a state work to increase the power of the non-state actor at the expense of the state.
Historically, a significant element of the international system since the Treaty of
Westphalia has been the sovereignty of states. Sovereignty, more or less, defines the
contextual borders of state power within the international system. Clearly, such power
evolved in the political, economic, and social fallout from Westphalia. The 16th and 17th
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centuries featured the consolidation of the state power and sovereignty at the expense of
non-state actors – “sovereignty helped the state become a relatively more efficient
economic and political organization, a condition necessary for defeating political
rivals.” 60 At this time, the state developed the necessary compunction to defeat threats to
sovereignty. Interestingly enough, the system of state centered sovereignty created a
political reality wherein threats to state actors most often were from other state actors.
The construct of international politics was mainly limited to states. Thus, the
international system featured numerous examples of state versus state conflicts. War and
peace typically were decisions of states. On the other hand, within this context often, but
not always, states assisted in the maintenance of sovereign power in other states in order
to promote stability within the system as a whole. A threat to a neighboring state was
seen as a direct threat to one’s own government. Accordingly, "the techniques that the
state developed were sovereignty and its ability to harness military innovation.” 61 In
addition, the state utilized both sovereignty and military innovation in a mutually
beneficial arrangement. Military innovation strengthened sovereignty and sovereignty
encouraged military innovation at the state level. Hence, the state - as an actor developed into a unitary force within the international system. Throughout this paper, I
have made the point that this arrangement with regard to the state is changing. Moreover,
the changes to the state result in both changes to the international system and increased
power by non-state actors.
A critical element to understanding the shifting and altering Westphalian era
international system is the historical basis of the system's development into state-centric
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relationships. As individual states began to develop under the auspices of princes and
other leaders, it became necessary to organize military functions in order to prevent
adversaries from seizing power. Part of the necessary evolution to protect the foundation
of power was the organization of resources into, what ultimately became the state system.
The "centralized political institution(s) for organizing resources" became the foundations
of the modern state. 62 In addition, the necessity of facing all threats - internal and
external - developed into a significant factor for states to address within the context of a
dynamic international system. Thus, the political and economic institutions grew
powerful enough in order to face both forms of threats.63 Clearly, the function of the state
was centrally born on the economic, political, military, and social institutions required in
maintaining the state monopoly over the exercise of power.
The development of the state system left many non-state actors disconnected from
both state and global power arrangements. That is, states took action to eliminate threats
of internal military, political, and economic hegemony. Threats within the international
system – ones that by definition came from other states – were not necessarily always
handled with force but strategies like deterrence and balancing of power – strategies that
quite often respected sovereignty. The social context of the international system clearly
elevated the state over other actors. The state responded to non-state threats with one of
two options - the challengers to state legitimacy either had to be co-opted or defeated but,
at the end of the day, destroyed. Serewicz holds that the state development of "superior
military organization based upon greater economic resources" gave the state
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sovereignty. 64 Thus, threats that were not successfully co-opted politically were defeated
militarily. The state sovereignty then served as a framework to "organize the political,
economic, and social realms to create stability.” 65 The state system's approach to external
and internal threats complemented each other in a way that the state sovereignty's
strength began to increase. That is, sovereignty “helped to create a barrier against outside
support for sub-state actors … and organize internal military resources against external
threats.” 66 Indeed, the sovereignty of the state allowed for increased powers of the state
both internally and externally. At that point, the conduct of military operations
underwent a serious metamorphosis. Instead of the "small, short, and poorly funded
campaigns based upon ad hoc organizational foundations, warfare became based upon
increasingly larger, more professional armies equipped with the logistical capability to
wage long campaigns.” 67 Serewicz also cites Spruyt in the argument that the
development of the state actor was linked to the evolution of state sovereignty. In other
words, according to Spruyt:
Sovereign boundaries allowed the state to create a zone of stability and
security to foster economic growth. The internal zone of stability, in turn,
contributed to the state's success against its organizational rivals by
supporting and reinforcing the external identity. Sovereignty's internal
and external aspects conferred economic and political advantages that
allowed the state to emerge as a viable and successful political
organization. 68
In more recent times and for a variety of reasons, non-state actors have adopted the
mechanisms to organize politically, socially, and economically. Hence, the state faces
new challenges. Serewicz also uses the research of Janice Thomson to advance the notion
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that the development of the original Westphalian system and the evolving nature of
military and political power in the sovereign state pushed the non-state actor to the
fringes of the system. 69 Sovereignty evolved out of the political and security relationships
founded on the development of states. Non-state violence was gradually reduced or
eliminated as the sovereignty of the state strengthened. Soon, non-state violence was
pushed to the edges of societal discourse where it remained relevant only as an
afterthought in most relationships of power politics. Inherently, non-state actors gained
credibility and power within the system through the use or potential use of violence but
only as a limited way and relegated to the fringes of international politics because the
societal agreements defined the non-state actor in that manner. Logically, as non-state
violence moved to the fringes of the system then non-state actors followed - or, at the
very most, became limited to one of many organizational inputs in foreign policy
formulation.
Indeed, the advancement of state sovereignty led to a decline in the quantity and
quality of non-state actors. Thus, logic follows, the more contemporary rise of non-state
actors originates from a loss of state sovereignty - or at the very minimum - an alteration
of previous global political and systemic exigencies. 70 In addition, non-state actors, due
to the intervening variable of globalization, have access to many of the military assets
previously enjoyed by only state actors. Moreover, an ever increasing trend for non-state
actors, for instance - al Qaeda, is co-opting the sovereignty of so called "failed states" in
order to also take advantage of certain elements of state sovereignty. As Serewicz
explains, the state, as its power historically increased, developed a unique ability to
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combine growing sovereignty with the "ability to harness military innovations.” 71 As
such, the nature of sovereignty and military innovations "allowed the state to meet
military and political threats from other political organizations.” 72 However, logic
dictates, as states face increased difficulty in meeting "military and political threats" and
as sovereignty decreases "military innovations" will no longer exist as a sole monopoly
of the state. In essence, the non-state actor has usurped roles traditionally within the
domain of the state.
To be sure, internal power politics also explain the loss of power by state actors
and the corresponding gain by non-state actors. That is, van Creveld argues that the state
has lost the ability to "adapt to organizations encroaching on areas where the state once
dominated.” The threats facing the state actor - van Creveld summarizes - is undermining
state sovereignty and that the "state's effectiveness as a political unit is ending." In
summary, the van Creveld thesis holds that the concepts of state sovereignty "…are
already being undermined by organizations that refuse to recognize the state's monopoly
over armed violence.” 73 Specifically, those challenging the idea of state's monopoly over
violence wishes to replace state ownership of "coercive violence.” In rhetorical terms, the
societal agreements of the Westphalia system have fractured. The change in the
international system has given the opportunity for non-state actors to gain more political
power and more power outside of the “fringe” areas making them able to operate in
domains traditionally viewed as belonging to the state. In addition, Serewicz argues that
"the state faces a crisis of authority" due to the challenges in state sovereignty. Hence,
the challenges are from "below, or within, by sub-state military actors and from above, or
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without, by supra-state organizations.” 74 Clearly, the power politics of Westphalia have
entered a new phase.
Another significant theoretical perspective to keep in mind when discussing the
advent of violence in the international system at the hands of non-state actors is the work
by Mansfield and Snyder that calls into question the democratic peace theory. Mansfield
and Snyder argue that the movement toward more liberalized political models results in
increased cases of violence. The reason for more violence is the fact that institutions are
not mature enough for a transition and the breakup of the previous political system results
in a greater likelihood of violence. A change or evolution in the dynamics and substance
of the state, I believe, lead to conditions that favor a change in behavior of that state – or
an alteration of societal agreements. It is my hypothesis that, overall, as more states
attempt a transition more non-state actors will emerge from states characterized by
weakened institutions.
The data available for state capacity in terms of both effectiveness and legitimacy
show that the levels of state power have fallen. Yet, on the other hand, civil liberties and
political rights have increased. On the face of it, the inverse correlation provides
difficulties in what one might expect. Increased civil liberties and political rights indicate
more states are politically liberalizing. Yet, one would generally expect increased levels
of effectiveness and legitimacy. The theoretical explanation for this phenomenon does,
however, make intuitive sense. In short, the race to liberalize economically and politically
after the fall of the Soviet Union has left states with weakened bureaucracies. The 1990s
trend of less government intervention often translated into less government. The world is
seeing the result of that expressed in terms of states having less capacity as defined by
74
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effectiveness and legitimacy. Referring to the initial equation of chapter one, the
argument that the change in the state has allowed for more non-state actors has, I believe,
taken another step. In this case, the weakened state allows for competitors to challenge its
sovereignty. A quantitative analysis of state capacity and political and civil rights
demonstrates this argument.
Much of the empirical evidence confirms the hypothesis the state is losing its
capacity – especially in terms of effectiveness and legitimacy. For example, the capacity
of state actors measured in quantitative terms illustrates the loss of power by the state. A
measure of capacity using the variables of effectiveness and legitimacy confirms an
overall loss of state capacity. Specifically, from 1990 to 1999 the mean levels of
effectiveness dropped approximately 49% and the mean levels of state legitimacy fell
about 56%.
Table 2 - State Capacity Measure 75
Effectiveness

1990

1999

Mean

0.037

0.019

Legitimacy

1990

1999

Mean

0.031

0.0135

75
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Figure 1 - Graphic Depiction of Mean Levels of State Capacity
The changes in capacity as expressed in terms of effectiveness and legitimacy are included side by
side in 1990 and 1999. The light bar represents effectiveness in both 1990 and 1999 and the dark
colored bar legitimacy in 1990 and 1999. The graph offers a visual depiction of the decrease in
both over the nine year period.
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A study of the values of political rights and civil liberties in the time before and
after the end of the Cold War also suggest a weakening of the capacity of the state.
Freedom House publishes annual values for both variables since 1972. A cursory
examination shows that the mean values for both political rights and civil liberties have
fallen consistently in the years since the end of the Cold War. The scale used by Freedom
House labels values from lowest as most liberal to highest as least liberal – so that, a
value of four indicates a more open system or more civil liberties than a value of three. In
using the Freedom House data since 1972, one can see a clear increase in political rights
and civil liberties – using current and historic mean levels.
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Table 3 - Political Rights and Civil Liberties Values 76
Year

Mean Political Rights

Mean Civil Liberties

1972-1989

4.3381

4.2493

1990-2003

3.5318

3.611

2003

3.3700

3.302

Figure 2 - Period Depiction of Mean Levels - Political Rights and Civil Liberties 77
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As the data illustrates, the average level of political rights has fallen 18.59% and the
average level of civil liberties 15.02% in the period after the fall of the Soviet Union –
indicating levels of political rights and civil liberties are becoming more liberalized.
When compared with current data, the reduction is even more dramatic. That is, the
average levels of political rights and civil liberties have fallen 22.32% and 22.29%
respectively from their averages during the Cold War Era to their current levels. Once
again, the data illustrates the movement toward more open state systems.
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At this point, it may be appropriate to offer a more extended discussion of
Mansfield and Snyder in light of the date revealing expanded civil liberties and civil
rights. The literature supports the notion of increased violence in cases of transition to
more democratic governance. Mansfield and Snyder examine the age-old theory that
democracies do not go to war with each other. Specifically, Mansfield and Snyder extend
the debate to states transitioning – both to and from democracy – in order to
quantitatively analyze the state’s likelihood of going to war. In short, the conclusion is
that governments in transition are “more aggressive and war prone, not less, and they do
fight wars with democratic states.” 78 In fact, states undergoing democratization “were
about two-thirds more likely to go to war than were states that did not experience a
regime change.” 79 Furthermore, states democratizing were “about 60 percent more likely
to go to war than states that were not democratizing.” 80 Mansfield and Snyder’s study
comes from the four basic historical cases of violent transitioning states – (1) midVictorian Great Britain, (2) Napoleon III’s France, (3) Wilhelmite Germany, and (4)
Japan’s “Tasho Democracy.” 81 . The four cases provide anecdotal evidence that
something may be awry with the Democratic Peace argument. Intuitively, Mansfield and
Snyder discuss the characteristics of a transition and why they may manifest into more
violent behavior. More or less, “the problem lies in the nature of domestic political
competition after the breakup of the autocratic regime.” 82 The elites mobilize the masses
– then find the same often difficult to control while, at the same time, the institutions and
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media are still immature and used by elites to “control political agendas” and, as a result,
a promotion of “belligerent pressure-group lobbies or upwellings of militancy in the
populace as a whole” results. 83 In quantitative terms, Mansfield and Snyder utilize
popularly accepted datasets in order to answer the research question. Gurr’s measure of
governance in Polity II is used to determine regime type and the Correlates of War
Dataset used in order to label a dispute as a war.84 That said, the one shortcoming of the
study is that it concentrates on 1811 to 1980 – because the two studies share those years
in common. 85 Certainly, Huntington’s so-called third wave of democratization is notably
absent – which may or may not have changed many of the findings. Also of interest in the
findings was the conclusion that ANY change in form of government increased the
chances of a war – autocracy to democracy 30-105% of any war and 50-135% of
interstate war while anocracy to democracy increased the likelihood from 15-100% in
any war and 50-135% in interstate war and, finally, even autocratizing states were more
likely to go to war than a state not changing a regime. 86 The bigger the leap – from closed
to open regime – the more “disproportionately [the] increase [in] the likelihood that a
country will engage in an interstate war (emphasis by authors).” 87 Again, the
institutional structure of the democratizing state – weak and not yet developed – mixed
with the nature of social groups makes the atmosphere more conducive for war. 88 Other
characteristics that play a role include the “widening of the political spectrum,”
“inflexible interests and short time horizons,” “competitive mass mobilization,” “the
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weakening of central authority,” and various “prestige strategies” that build support at
home through activities abroad. 89 Mansfield and Snyder offer strategies for reducing the
importance of the elites – especially former military commanders and leaders – in order
to reduce the likelihood of war. 90 That said, the long run is still best served by more
stable democracies. 91
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Chapter Four
The Failed State
In addition to a quantitative weakening of the state, the occurrence of failed states has
also become more common. The failed state fits the model and equation offered in
chapter one in that the changing nature of the state allows for more powerful non-state
actors (that is: X+ ΔY = Z). While the system features a number of examples of
transitioning regimes, a study of incidents of state failure reveals, at the very least,
circumstantial evidence to support a trend toward overall lost state sovereignty.
In the thirty- five year period from 1955 to 1990, the world bore witness to only nine
incidents of state failure while the eight year period of 1990 to 1998 claimed twelve cases
of state failure. In raw terms, using 1990 as a baseline, the world averaged 0.257 state
failures per year before 1990 and 1.5 failures per year after. Admittedly, such data alone
would be insignificant. However, basic and unsophisticated data taken as part of the
larger picture reveals a loss of state capacity by actors within the international system.
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Table 4 - State Failures, 1955-1998 92
(Includes “Near State Failures”)
Before Fall of USSR
State

After Fall of USSR

Years

State

Years

Congo

1960

Somalia

1990- current

Cyprus

1964

Liberia

1990-96

Dom. Rep.

1965-66

Yugoslavia

1991

Nigeria

1966

USSR

1991

Bangladesh

1974-75

Afghanistan

1992-95

Argentina

1975-76

Tajikistan

1992

Lebanon

1975-1990

Bosnia- Herzegov.

1992-96

Chad

1978-1983

Burundi

1992-96

Iran

1978-1981

Rwanda

1994

Congo

1997- current

Sierra Leone

1997- current

Guinea-Bissau

1998

Ultimately, state capacity is being challenged at many levels. Zero-sum power equations
suggest that power lost by certain actors must, in fact, be gained by others. Within this
framework, I will contend that non-state actors are the emerging force in the international
system. As states have lost power, non-state actors have been the benefactors.
Many political scientists and security analysts have turned to an examination of
the failed state phenomenon in their research on counterterrorism. The notion of the
failed state has been linked – in a number of studies – to terror actors and the non-state
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actor. Furthermore, the Bush administration – in recognition of the serious nature of the
problem - dealt with the issue in the National Security Strategy of 2002 and the National
Security Strategy of 2006, both of which pointed to the importance in addressing both
failed and failing states as a part of national security. 93 Failed states have become an
important research agenda for academics as well as a topic of discussion for security
specialists. This chapter will attempt to serve as an introduction to many of the issues
concerning state failure as they relate to the broader effort to fight terrorism.
In common parlance and everyday usage, the idea of a state entails a
government’s ability to maintain a monopoly of power over recognizable borders. As a
result, a failed state would consist of a government unable to maintain the monopoly over
force. That is, other actors – non-state actors – in the form of terrorists and criminal
organizations enjoy the ability to project force in competition to the state. In short, the
failed state argument maintains that the inability of a state to control its own territory
creates a vacuum of power from which the non-state actor can usurp state power and
enjoy a freedom of action within that state. Indeed, one may point to Osama bin Laden
and al-Qaeda as a clear example of the role of failed states during an era of terrorism. Bin
Laden utilized the freedom of activity inherent to Sudan and, later, Afghanistan in order
to create a global terror organization. Despite efforts from many, including the United
States, bin Laden remained unmolested in other sovereign states. Any attempt to kill or
capture bin Laden would have (and did) involve a violation of Sudan’s sovereignty, in the
case of a Saudi attempt to assassinate bin Laden, or Afghanistan’s sovereignty, as the
United States did during the Clinton administration after the U.S. embassy bombings in
Africa. More importantly, the ability of bin Laden to fade into the countryside and
93
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continuously evade capture or elimination and move about without concern for
government law enforcement officials points to the haven provided by failed states for
terrorists and other criminals.

Historical Lessons
Although the failed state may have been a recent image of political scientists, the reality
of failed states as important variables in a state’s security is really not a new
development. In the United States, during the presidential administrations of William
Howard Taft (1908-1912) and Woodrow Wilson (1912-1920), Mexico was a state in
turmoil – and, perhaps, embodied many of the characteristics of a failing state. Mexico's
erstwhile corrupt dictator Porfirio Diaz had been overthrown in 1910 by the populist
Francisco Madero. Although Madero offered a policy with a number of democratic
reforms, he soon wore out his welcome with American business interests. With the
encouragement of the U.S., Madero was soon overthrown by Victoriano Huerta. Huerta
represented a more pro-U.S. and pro-business perspective than Diaz. However, Huerta’s
government murdered Madero and in doing so forced the U.S. to withhold recognition of
the Huerta regime for image reasons – the United States did not want to be closely
aligned with such a violent regime. A power struggle inside Mexico ensued, lasting for
several years and, ultimately, impacting the national security of the United States. In
1914, a leading opposition figure, Venustiano Carranza seized control of Mexico.
Wilson, upset over Carranza’s failure to accept American advice in the creation of the
new Mexican government, considered supporting another potential leader – Pancho Villa.
Villa was a former aide and lieutenant to Carranza who had created his own army. By
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late 1915, Wilson finally decided on preliminary recognition for the Carranza regime.
However, Villa now became angry at what he perceived as a betrayal by the United
States and a series of attacks followed. In January 1916, Villa seized 16 American miners
from a train in northern Mexico and murdered them. Two months later, Villa and his
army raided Columbus, New Mexico and killed 17 more Americans. The United States,
under General John J. Pershing and with the permission of Carranza, entered Mexico in
pursuit of Villa. Villa, of course, was never captured. However, U.S. forces and Mexican
forces loyal to Carranza clashed twice. The situation stood perilously close to war.
Wilson’s withdraw of American troops and a formal recognition of Carranza eased
tensions.
The story of Pancho Villa illustrates the importance of failed states. A failing state
– or at least a chaotic state – on the immediate southern border certainly had broader
national security implications. In the long term, the results may have been even more
problematic. Indeed, Germany recognized the strain in Mexican-U.S. relations and, on
the eve of World War I, attempted to push Mexico into a war with the United States with
the promise of regaining territory lost during the Mexican-American War in an offer
made in what is now simply called the Zimmerman telegram. Although it may be
impossible to prove or disprove, one could argue that the experience of Pancho Villa and
Carranza were part of the impetuous for the so-called Zimmerman Telegram and
Germany’s attempt to widen World War I. In this case, the failing state had security
implications well beyond the direct results of Villa’s attacks. But also, the story of Villa
indicates the importance of maintaining states able to deal with challenges to its
authority.
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In fact, another lesson of state strength was learned even earlier in the history of
the United States. After the War for Independence with Great Britain, the Articles of
Confederation were established as a roadmap for governance, but they created a very
weak and decentralized form of government. Subsequently, war veteran Daniel Shays
(and others)– behaving as a non-state actor – challenged the government’s foreclosure
and sale of farms during the summer of 1786, eventually taking up arms in what became
known as Shays Rebellion. The lack of a strong central government and the inability of
the Articles to create a counterforce to Shays eventually led to the hiring of a state militia
by wealthy businessmen. The rebellion was defeated in January 1787, but at the same
time, elites learned a valuable lesson about the ability of non-state actors to challenge the
government’s monopoly on power. A direct result of the Shays Rebellion was the push
for a stronger government. In fact, while a 1786 meeting in Annapolis to discuss the
Articles drew only five delegations, after Shays Rebellion the 1787 Constitutional
Convention boasted participation of 55 delegates from all states save Rhode Island.
While Shays Rebellion serves as an analogy for the weak and ineffective
centralized government which resulted from the Articles of Confederation, the Whiskey
Rebellion of 1794 illustrates how a more strong centralized government can deal
effectively with threats to the state’s monopoly on the use of force. In 1794, farmers in
western Pennsylvania refused to pay new excise taxes on whiskey – often used as a
means of currency in the region. George Washington responded by calling on the militias
of three states and personally marching an army of approximately 15,000 – a force larger
than he had ever commanded in the Revolutionary War- in order to meet the threat.
Needless to say, the Whiskey Rebellion was quickly quashed. Thus, both events
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ultimately illustrate the importance of a state maintaining a monopoly over the use of
force. Whether 1794 or 1914, the most important lessons from these examples is that a
state’s national security relies on a considerable extent on its power to govern its people,
as well as the power of its neighbors to govern their own people effectively.
In 1904, President Theodore Roosevelt realized the importance of what we would later
call failed and failing states when he issued the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe
Doctrine. The Monroe Doctrine closed the Americas off from European colonization in
1823. Roosevelt reasoned that European aggression in the region of the Americas may
come due to a state’s instability – very close to what we would currently define as a
failing state. Hence, Roosevelt proclaimed that the United States could interfere with
neighbors unable to maintain their own sovereignty. The only modern difference is that
globalization has made all states virtual neighbors.

Contemporary Challenges
The discussion over failed states results in a number of theoretical and policy questions,
however, that must be addressed in order to more fully understand the role of such states.
The most obvious question is how do we measure a failed state? Certainly, every
government has a section of territory where the state lacks a monopoly on power.
Particular areas of the United States feature rival power centers in the form of gangs or
other criminal organizations. In fact, police are often reluctant to enter such areas – does
that make the United States a failed state? In addition, the United States clearly lacks
control over its southern borders. Again, should we consider that lack of control as
defining a failed state? The United States would not, under even the strictest measures, be
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considered a failing or failed state. The point is, however, that the obvious examples of a
failed state are somewhat easy to point out. At some level, moreover, the action becomes
somewhat subjective and open to a great deal of discussion. Portions of Colombia are
under the exclusive control of the narco-terrorist group FARC; large portions of
Afghanistan – especially outside of Kabul – remain in the control of warlords; the
Baluchistan region of Pakistan certainly lacks a government monopoly of power, and
many other germane examples exist worldwide. So, we are left with the difficult question
of appropriately defining a failed state. Another important question would be how exactly
to handle the failed state. Does the danger of the failed state call for the United States to
be a world guarantor of states? What can be done as part of the effort to fight terrorism in
order to address the failed states of the world? Finally, how significant of a variable is the
failed state when examining the roots of terrorism?
The international system has, for hundreds of years, consisted of states interacting
as unitary actors in a way to maximize power within the international system. Although
some may claim that the above realist interpretation is open to debate and offer
alternative explanations of global politics, most would agree that the state was (and still
remains) the primary actor within the international system. In times past, the paths of
states may have never crossed. Hence, a failed or weak state in Asia may have very little
impact in Europe. To borrow a phrase by the former Speaker of the House Tip O’Neill –
“all politics is local.” So that the strength or ability of a state to govern – say El Salvador
– mattered little to another – for example, Greece, the two states have little in common in
terms of culture, history, and policy interaction and were not rivals within the
international system. Globalization, however, has changed the distant relationship. For
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example, a non-state actor dedicated to regime change in Greece may take refuge in El
Salvador and direct both rhetorical and physical attacks toward Greek leadership. Greece
would be forced to rely on El Salvador in order to enforce laws and, ultimately, protect
the Greek regime from attacks emanating inside El Salvador. As the hypothetical
narrative illustrates, the strength of one state - especially because of globalization – now
matters to other states. Hence, states unable to even maintain a monopoly on power
within its own borders are perceived to be less likely to address issues of poverty and to
deal with threats from disease and, especially, terrorism.

Definitions
At this point, it is appropriate to make several comments with regard to definitions – in
order to more clearly identify failed versus failing states. Specifically, a failed state is the
end-point of failing states. 94 Typically, a weak state may be failing – for example, Sri
Lanka as it fights the Tamil Tigers for the third decade or Indonesia as unable to fully
control areas of Aceh and Papua – but not pass the threshold to a collapsed state. 95 A
failed state is one unable to perform its duties on several levels – “… when violence
cascades into an all-out internal war, when standards of living massively deteriorate,
when the infrastructure of ordinary life decays, and when the greed of rulers overwhelms
their responsibilities to better their people and their surroundings.” 96 In more direct
terms, a recent State Failure Task Force defined state failure as “instances in which
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central state authority collapses for several years.” 97 The number of completely collapsed
states is historically small, but the number of collapsing states somewhat more
troublesome. As a result, the Task Force purposely extended its definition of state failure
to include a more inclusive list of “civil conflicts, political crises, and massive humanrights violations that
are typically associated with state breakdown.” 98 From 1955 to 1998, the Task Force
discovered 251 events and 136 cases of state failure. 99
Milliken and Krause studied the evolving definition of state failure and offer a
thesis addressing the prescient issue of what exactly composes a “failed state.” They
advance the argument that the state cannot be merely classified as a static entity but,
instead, an ever changing work in progress. As such, part of the contemporary analysis
of states necessarily must include the discussion of failed and/or collapsed states.
Furthermore, state failure and its measurement utilize two distinct contexts - a state may
"institutionally" fail or "functionally fail.” 100 As a result, state failure refers to "dashed
expectations" of a state or of what the citizens expect the state to accomplish. In
addition, the failure remains more subjective. Thus, the numbers of states in the midst or
recently collapsed institutionally remain relatively low - the "former Yugoslavia,
Georgia, Haiti, Colombia, and Afghanistan.”
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Policy Implications
Robert Cooper, former European Union diplomat and advisor to British Prime Minister
Tony Blair, argues the threat posed by failed states is so great that it offers a clear
rationalization for a new form of colonialism - aimed at interventions in failed or failing
states. 101 Francis Fukuyama noted, “weak or failed states are close to the root of many of
the world’s most serious problems, from poverty and AIDS to drug trafficking and
terrorism.” 102 Chester Crocker, a former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State has observed
“state failure affects a broad range of U.S. interests … It contributes to regional
insecurity, weapons proliferation, narcotics trafficking, and terrorism.” 103 Within the
context of new world geopolitics the balance of power system has become outdated and
not useful in formulating policy and attention must be paid to the concept of failed states.
Cooper contends that the system is best summarized as one consisting of interdependence
among state actors. It is the interdependence factor that moves politics past the local level
and to the system level. Hence, failed states do matter and impact other states throughout
the international system. 104
Thus, the context of world politics and the careful stability inherent to an
anarchical system become threatened very clearly with the phenomenon of "failed states."
A failed state is representative of chaos - a chaos removing the state from the global
political and/or economic community. Once removed from the economic benefits
inherent to the interdependent structure of the contemporary global system, a "failed
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state" turns to narcotics, terrorism, and other criminal activities in order to compensate
for removal from the global community. In both failed and failing states, a number of
non-state actors fill the void left by the state to provide products of government and prey
on the state of chaos in order to increase their own power and wealth.
Why, then, does a state begin to fail? Can we see any warning signs or trace the
failing or failed state to a moment when intervention would be helpful? A number of
wide and varied explanations for the failing state offer somewhat of a glimpse into the
complexity of the issues involved. Fukuyama suggests the end of the Cold War led to
increased incidents of the failed state and left a number of both weak and failed states in
areas like the Middle East, the Caucasus, and Central and South Asia. 105 At the same
time, international organizations like the World Bank and International Monetary Fund
pushed for less government involvement in the economy. Fukuyama notes that this
“Washington consensus” was an effort to reform the economy but, ultimately, spilled
over into the overall structure of the state. In addition, the reforms came at a critical time
when many states were emerging from authoritarian rule. Hence, the Washington
consensus placed very little emphasis on overall institutional development and state
building. The already existing poor institutional framework – with the added pressure of
the Washington consensus- resulted in an overall reduction of state strength. 106
Crocker takes a longer and more general view in defining the process of state
failure. 107 First, the process of state failure is one of a complex and lengthy process of
state devolution. Furthermore, a variety of inputs result in the concept of a failed state (1) rulers may corrupt the vehicles of governance, (2) corrupt elites may act with criminal
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networks in order to claim the material resources of a state, (3) specific regions may
feature the general lack of governmental authority and, often, illegal trade results, (4) a
transition from authoritarian government results in the state's loss of monopoly on power,
and, finally, (5) large sections of the state feature the loss of power. 108 Hence, a cycle of
state failure is quite often easy to view. This raises at least three difficult questions:
whether powerful states should intervene, when in the process should they intervene, and
how such an intervention should be conducted.
Also of note in an examination of state failure is the impact of external support.
That is, according to Crocker, "states with shallow domestic legitimacy tend to fail when
they lose foreign support …" 109 He notes that part of the equation of failed states, is the
number of transitions to democracy in the 1990's. Specifically, a number of the
transitions would simply fail. Some may result in the reemergence of an autocratic
leader, some may simply become very weak, failing states, and others "will descend into
chaotic warlord struggles.” 110 In fact, Crocker argues "In much of the transitional world those at-risk societies concentrated in Africa, the Middle East, and southwestern Asia there is a footrace underway between legitimate governmental institutions and legal
business enterprises, on the one hand, and criminal networks, often linked to warlords or
political factions associated with security agencies, on the other.” 111 Milliken and Krause
maintain legitimization is a process of function within a state - charged with providing
"security, representation, and welfare.” 112 In the race toward legitimization versus state
failure, the legitimate networks must outdistance and outperform the networks of
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corruption. As Crocker observes, "Those who lead the cells and networks that hollow out
failing states focus with a laser like intensity on exploiting opportunity and creating facts
on the ground. Whether loosely arrayed in symbiotic relations or more closely
coordinated by a central brain, they find space to operate in the vacuums left by a
declining or transitional state - and they eat what they kill.” 113
Susan Woodward has also examined the impact of failed states upon the
international system. In short, a failed state represents the undermining of a key
assumption in international politics - the primacy of the state actor. Furthermore,
Woodward points to the fact that globalization is already challenging the power of the
state. Yet, ironically, globalization "requires states that function - governments capable
of giving sovereign guarantees, exercising sovereign power and responsibility, and
controlling their sovereign borders.” 114 Milliken and Krause considered the concept of
"economic globalization" a primary influence in the fall of the state. In fact, economic
globalization tends to accentuate the societal cleavages in conjunction with inefficient
and uneven distribution of government resources. 115 Woodward suggests "there is a
powerful association between internal disintegration, fragmentation, massive civil
violence, and the rise of warlordism, on the one hand, and states' lack of strategic
significance for major powers and the uncontrolled proliferation of conventional arms
since the end of the cold war, on the other.” 116 Indeed, the lack of state power effectively
eliminates a key limiting mechanism on internal politics. 117 The non-state actor emerges
from or makes a home in the remains of a state in order to operate unmolested from any
113
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form of legal authority. Certainly, the model of drug trade in areas of Colombia,
Afghanistan, and Myanmar in addition to relative lawlessness in Liberia, Southern Sudan,
and most of Somalia illustrate the ability of non-state actors to freely operate in failed
states or regions.
Crocker argues that the U.S. - led War on Terrorism is incomplete as it is only
targeting the current manifestations of terror. Hence, the long-term terror implications
are not addressed. Primary among the unaddressed concerns are the role of failed states.
In addition, the rhetoric of the War on Terror is necessarily misleading because an enemy
does not exist - enemies exist. Terrorism, according to Crocker, is merely a "tool.” 118
Indeed, the work in Afghanistan and Iraq as well as the targeting of al-Qaeda are simply
the "first steps" toward global security. 119 In addition, Washington also must concentrate
on "sustaining regional security, leading coalitions and institutions to help failing and
threatened states, and winning the struggle after wars and regimes change.” 120
Furthermore, Crocker contends:
…state failure directly affects a broad range of U.S. interests, including
the promotion of human rights, good governance, the rule of law, religious
tolerance, environmental preservation, and opportunities for U.S. investors
and exporters…unless the United States and its principal partners engage
proactively to prevent and contain state failure, rogue regimes may seize
power in additional failed or failing states, raising the specter of fresh
adversaries that seek WMD and harbor terrorists. Moreover, the United
States must learn to rebuild states after overturning their regimes, or the
whole enterprise will backfire. 121
In explaining what needs to be done in order to prevent the advent of "failed
states," Crocker points to the fact that the number of sovereign states in 1945 was 51
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while almost 200 exist today. 122 In addition, although the failed state is typically a poor
state, the economy does not provide a complete answer. 123 A look at civilizations also
comes up short in attacking "failed states.” That said, Crocker argues (with relevant
empirical data) that "weak democracies" and "reforming autocracies" are states "highly
prone to state failure.” 124 In the end, national boundaries as well as ethnic cleavages are
not the sole sources of the problem of "state failure.” Instead, Crocker looks to "ethnic
imbalance between a dominant majority and a large minority" and "contested natural
resources and separatist movements supported by well-heeled expatriate communities" as
important antecedents to a failed state. 125
Be that as it may, Woodward provides several convincing arguments as to why
the United States should be concerned over the existence of failed states. First, she notes,
the constraints of the Cold War era - the threat of nuclear attack - are largely non-existent
in the contemporary era of global politics. The Cold War's competition of superpowers
acted as a limiting factor on worldwide behavior, yet no other natural limiting factor of
behavior has arrived in order to replace the Cold War equilibrium. That is, should the
Soviet Union or United States have gone to far with a foreign policy directive, both
risked a war with the other and the corresponding threat of escalation to the point where
the virtual existence of the planet would be threatened. In addition, the Cold War era led
to the use of foreign aid in a manner to "purchase" friendship and loyalty. In
contemporary global relationships, aid packages - which Woodward notes are essential
for some states to maintain authority - are more often tied to neo-liberal "policies of
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liberalization, privatization, budgetary cuts and devolution, and overall fiscal
conservatism.” 126 Thus, the end result includes "increasing regional inequalities and
grievances, social polarization and abandonment, and a power vacuum that open the door
to movements for regional autonomy or secession, to alternative elites who aspire to total
power through ethnic and nationalist appeals, and to vicious cycles of public protests,
police repression by weak governments, communal violence, and local insurgencies.” 127
A second argument Woodward provides as proof of the need to intervene in
failing states is the end results of failed states. She argues that, "what seems to matter
about failed states are the consequences" including political violence, refugee problems,
and mass humanitarian emergencies. As a result, international actors contemplate action
only when the state has failed. Thus, Woodward argues that the response is more
humanitarian than political - which, by definition, suggests a quick end to emergency
conditions and not the political negotiation required for long term solutions. She believes
that "the violence [is] being caused by ethnic hatred [and] begin to treat such differences
and presumed hatreds as essences rather than as contingencies produced by alterable
conditions. This is especially the case if interveners organize in terms of 'enemies' and
'victims' and thus take sides; by doing so they harden lines of conflict rather than
reinforce instances of cooperation and the capacity for it.” 128
The breakdown of governance, which produces a power vacuum, is also a key
difficulty in dealing with failing states. Instead of traditional forms of governing power,
authority in such a state is claimed by others based upon their possession of some
territory and some weapons by individuals who are taking advantage of fear in order to
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capitalize upon the insecurities inherent to such a breakdown of state power.
Furthermore, such arrangements are reciprocal by nature – the “legitimacy” must be
returned by some form of government services. In the failed state, the reciprocal service
is often looting and/or criminal activity which leads to further state failure. Woodward
posits the “ethnic, religious, linguistic, or clan differences” within a society are
significantly exacerbated by the failure of the state’s governance and economic functions.
These dividing lines often become magnified by the influx of resources internationally
from groups or individuals sharing loyalties and offering sympathy to a particular
cause. 129 Furthermore, “the violence [is] being caused by ethnic hatred [and] begin to
treat such differences and presumed hatreds as essences rather than as contingencies
produced by alterable conditions. This is especially the case if interveners organize in
terms of ‘enemies’ and ‘victims’ and thus take sides; by doing so they harden the lines of
conflict rather than reinforce instances of cooperation and the capacity for it.” 130
How does the discussion of failed and failing states directly impact concerns over
terrorism? Much has already been said and alluded to in this effort focusing on the ability
of non-state actors, for the purposes of this chapter - terrorist groups - to usurp some of
the space inherent to statehood in order to operate freely. Robert Rotberg characterizes
globalization as the intervening variable between "failed states" and terrorism. That is,
the past strategy of isolating failed states simply has become immaterial in the era of
globalization. The realities of international relations demand effectual states and the
continuation of failed states endanger security at a global level. Rotberg persists,
furthermore, that failed states grow to be both "reservoirs" as well as "exporters of
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terror." 131 Essentially, the literature suggests a failed state is marked in levels of rising
corruption at the hands of leaders using the rule of force to establish legitimacy. All the
while, government services become benefits enjoyed only by a select few. Legitimacy is
finally attacked by the masses within a final stage of state failure. At that point,
reinforced societal cleavages - ethnic, religious, linguistic and more - become more
pronounced. Finally, the inequities of history become fresh memories in the minds of
mass society and historical grievances become part of the contemporary political agenda
of settlement by force. A state, at that point, becomes perilously close to state failure which becomes a threat to world security. Rotberg's solution is a fourfold approach: (1)
improve economic conditions, (2) reintroduce a rule of law, (3) reestablish political
institutions and (4) offer a new chance of civil society. 132
Rotberg's premise gains in expediency when seen through the perspective
provided by Takeyh and Gvosdev. In their recent essay, these researchers speak both of
the role of failed states as well as the smaller failures within states - cities, geographical
areas, etc. The importance of investigating sovereign states and governments facing
potential failure is paramount, as both are linked to the reality that a group like al-Qaeda
is much different from the IRA or the PKK that have "limited, irredentist claims."
Conversely, al-Qaeda is "not confined territorially or ideologically to a particular region."
Al-Qaeda is more advanced and boasts its own "infrastructure" and is "self-sufficient." 133
As a result, al-Qaeda, and the future organizations based similarly on global geographical
realities look for failed states into which to move their organization. Indeed, the state's
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sovereignty becomes host of (and used by) non-state actors, terror organizations, to
achieve their own goals.
The failed state theory is evident in many instances of terror organizations around
the world. Key, too, are geographic areas or cities or villages that can be classified as
"failed" because of the lack of coherent central government control. A good example is
the Bosnian village of Bocinja Donja – a village which is widely described as lawless and
a haven for radical Islamic movements. In addition, Italy (among other states) remains
quite concerned of the security threat posed by Albania and its links to both criminal
networks and Osama bin Laden. In fact, the port of Durres, Albania is noted for its role
as a center of transit for smuggling and for Osama bin Laden's complicity in activities
originating in the port.
In short, Takeyh and Gvosdev argue terror groups "have gained control over
territory in a failed state through a Faustian bargain with authorities usually by offering
its services to the failed state during time of conflict." 134 Other factors also contribute to
the usefulness of failed states as bases for terror groups. First, failed states lack the
infrastructure of any semblance of law enforcement. In addition, a failed state also offers
a population of ready-made recruits – as Takeyh and Gvosdev observe, “failed states
create pools of recruits and supporters for terrorist groups who can use their resources
and organizations to step into the vacuum left by the collapse of civil society." 135
Finally, the levels of poverty and corruption typically associated with failed states makes
the viability of bribes more compelling – again, allowing for terrorist or criminal
organizations the freedom to behave in any manner it wishes.
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What has been offered in this chapter obviously does not offer a complete answer
the basic questions on how to define a failed versus failing state, the role of failed states
in terrorism, the importance or the method for intervention, or any other of a number of
relevant policy questions. These and other related questions are addressed amply
throughout the political science and security studies literature. Instead, the chapter is
meant to offer suggestions as to the current debate of the strength of the state and how it
applies to concern of national security with regard to efforts to counter terrorism.
Obviously, not every failed state will produce an Osama bin Laden. What also should be
clear, however, is that failed states do matter – not only for humanitarian reasons but also
for basic issues of national security. The concept of a strong state is one as old as the
republic itself and the concern over stability in other states has a historical precedent.
What remains clear is that the shrinking of the world – through globalization – should
offer pause for consideration on how to deal with the failing or failed state
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Chapter 5
Warfare in the Evolving International System
The argument of this paper has been that the international system and the composition of
states are changing in such a way that non-state actors are more powerful. Typically, one
of the most common attributes of a state has always been considered to be the ability to
make war. Therefore, a change in the international system and a change in the state level
should also bring different manifestations of war and violence. As a result, I believe that
it is worthwhile to examine war and where the concept of war has been, where it is, and
where it is going. In doing so, I hope to show that the international system and the
behavior of states has evolved in such a way that the conventional methods of warfare
have also changed. Again, this is due to any number of variables at both the system and
state levels of analysis. Furthermore, the discussion of warfare and its evolution will
show that the way war is fought is a social construct. Within that construct, variables
from the system and state level guide the choices made in warfare. Since the state and
system have both evolved then so should the characteristics of warfare.
Geoffrey Blainey commented in The Causes of War, “In human behavior few
events are more difficult to predict than the course and duration of a war: that is one of
the vital unlearned lessons of warfare.” 136 Indeed, perhaps one of the most significant
questions a social scientist can ask is how will warfare look in the future? Who will fight
and what will motivate actors to use violence? Who will be the targets of warfare and
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how will society, in general, be impacted? This section is an attempt to begin a discussion
with regard to some of these questions. I will effort to place warfare within the broader
context of society and provide an analysis of the evolution of warfare – its past, present,
and future characteristics. Ultimately, I hope to illustrate the connections between both
warfare and society while, at the same time, making predictions with regard to the future
of warfare. Indeed, the evolving nature of warfare, I will argue, parallels the evolution of
the international system.
The progression of conflict and warfare over the past fifty years brings to light the
reality that the traditional Westphalian composition of unitary state actors no longer
dominates the international system. Although states still apply most of the power, nonstate groups such as al-Qaeda – in the form of extremist ideological organizations – have
expropriated space within the international system in order to employ expressions of
force independent from the state. Key to understanding contemporary, as well as future,
forms of conflict is an appreciation of the role of the non-state soldier and, more
generally, how the dynamic nature of warfare mirrors the evolution of society.
Warfare and the norms of society share a long and storied past. A study of the
development of international law and behavior in times of armed conflict reveals the
close connection between the evolution of society and of warfare. As the act of warfare
became more centralized to state actors, the norms and behavior of participants in acts of
war evolved. Concerns over treatment of those at war date as far back as the second
millennium B.C. when the wars between Egypt and Sumeria led to a construction of
codified behavior to follow during warfare. Much later, the originator of international law
– Hugo Grotius – in De Jure Belli ac Pacis (1625) – argued that it was permissible to kill
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all subjects found in captured territory. 137 Many may take issue with the norms of
Grotius, yet his work suggests an examination of codes of warfare did merit debate as
early as the era preceding the advent of the Westphalian state centric system.
Specifically, Grotius discussed norms of behavior within the context of natural law. That
is, Grotius argued the source of all law was found in the needs of the society, as a whole,
fused with the popular demand for justice. Hence, international law – and its subsidiary –
the behavior of belligerents in warfare merely were a social construct. Ultimately, a
desire would evolve to hold those engaged in armed conflict to some form of limitations.
In fact, efforts were made as early as 1474 to hold belligerents accountable for actions
during warfare with the trial of Peter von Hagenback. 138 In one of the original examples
of a war crime trial, Hagenback – the Burgundian governor of Breisach was charged for
crimes committed by his forces against civilians while engaged in combat within the
Holy Roman Empire. The Grotian school of international law, as a reflection of natural
law, later evolved into the Doctrine of Positivism that drives contemporary international
regimes. Positivists suggest law went beyond the needs of society and, instead, the people
created international law. As a result, the norms and behaviors prescribed in international
law clearly reflected societal agreements. 139
Discussion of behavior in warfare ultimately led to norm construction –
suggested by the evolving attitudes toward warfare. Initially, the state’s concerns with
norms were built upon a necessity for discipline within organized armies. A cessation of
the looting frequently linked with victory and resulting collapse in obedience required
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some form of solution. States called for norms of warfare in order to constrict rule over
the military. The military, furthermore, supported norm construction because they were
essentially a mobile populace. Conventions of behavior assured at least minimal
protection during warfare, theoretically, regardless of where a soldier called home. As
time progressed, a demand for institutional guidelines developed. Henri Dunant founded
the International Committee of the Red Cross in 1859 after watching the poor treatment
of soldiers on Italian battlefields. During the U.S. Civil War, President Abraham Lincoln
attempted to codify laws regarding behavior during warfare with the development of the
1863 Lieber Code. Gustave Moynier – after the Franco-Prussian War – called for an
international criminal court in 1870. A number of conferences in Hague, created to
address the treatment of belligerents, emerged at the turn of the 19th century – the most
notable in 1899 and 1907. Trials at Nurembourg called many of the Nazis to respond to
charges of the war crimes of World War II. In more current times, the effort to create an
International Criminal Court and the construction of International Criminal Tribunals for
both the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda support the notion that norms of warfare are
social constructs. 140 Each example typifies an evolving view of what is and is not
acceptable in the conduct of war. Taken a step further, global prohibition regimes on such
disparate subjects as piracy, slavery, drugs, and whaling all point to the epistemic role
society plays in the construction of what is and is not acceptable behavior. 141 Clearly, the
norms and expected behavior during warfare are, at least at some levels, constructs of
society. As a result, analysts can point to warfare as a developing phenomenon beholden
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to societal inputs. As behavior of belligerents is molded by society in the forms of norms,
the ability to wage wars and the types of wars waged are also constructs of the
agreements – tacit or explicit – of the actors within the international system.
Given the notion that the drama of warfare is one written within a cultural
context, an examination of the major actors in warfare is necessary. Clausewitz – in the
oft-cited On War - discusses the primary actor in warfare as the state. 142 The Treaty of
Westphalia (1648) shaped the necessary legal norms to effectively label warfare as a state
versus state enterprise. Westphalia signaled the birth of the concept of state as a
sovereign actor in place of the predominant international actor of the time - the Catholic
Church. Before Westphalia, non-state players dominated the landscape of warfare and
political, social, economic and religious motives all were completely matted. The pattern
previous to Westphalia revealed warfare as an exercise common to many actors which
included barbarian tribes, feudal barons, free cities, and even private armies hired or
spurred on by religion. Pre-Westphalian arrangements represented a decentralized
pendulum of power and the numerous actors engaged in warfare illustrated that reality.
As a result, war as an expression of politics is a relatively new phenomenon in the
international system. In fact, before the use of warfare in the form of the Clausewitzian
dogma of politics through other means, motives of war were often of a non-political
nature and included notions of justice, religion, and existence. 143 Hence, warfare
suggested a belligerent may either be “good” or “bad.” Thus, war may be used as a
“stick” in order to accomplish some level of justice. The notion of justice in war led to
theoretical discussions of what exactly makes a war just – and the actors good or bad.
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Within this mindset, Augustine advanced the “just war” theory as an example of when
war would be permissible under the laws of god. Cicero developed the theory of
just/unjust war in an attempt to closely relate war to a legal remedy. In point of fact,
Romans considered adversaries to be no more than “criminals.” Again, each example
illustrates the constructive role society plays in guidelines for behavior during warfare.
In addition to justice, wars for religion also have a long historical legacy. So
called “holy wars” are part of the record of the Old Testament. Indeed, the Israelites
spared nothing in efforts to fight wars over religion. Christianity was a target of the
notion of religious warfare until Constantine converted. Westphalia and the state-centric
structure it created somewhat reduced (but did not eliminate) the likelihood of religion as
a source of warfare. In many ways the growth of the Christian community made possible
larger wars for religion – but, typically, as a secondary motive. Indeed, the Spanish and
Portuguese colonized “in the name of the cross” and often gave Native Americans the
opportunity to convert (or die). Yet, economic motives and power politics ultimately
spurred colonization. In addition, a long tradition of warfare exists between Catholics and
Protestants. However, one of the most storied examples of Protestant versus Catholic
violence, the “Troubles” of Northern Ireland, were more an expression of civil rights and
a reaction to systemic deficiencies than a religious holy war. Yet, wars primarily for the
sake of religious ends ceased after 1648. Instead, wars were molded in terms of power –
in the style of Clausewitz and Machiavelli.
The timeline of history includes many instances of a belligerent simply fighting a
war in order to maintain its existence. In fact, existence may be the single most important
reason for warfare over the ages. Thus, warfare is not an extension of policy but is policy.
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The French-Algerian War illustrates the warfare for existence model. Algeria framed the
war into a fight for survival while France simply scrutinized the conflict from a more
rational cost-benefit analysis. A complete list of Israeli versus Arab wars also fit the
typology of war for existence – the existence of the state of Israel. The one notable
exception, the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in June of 1982, ended in disaster for Israel. In
fact, World War II evolved, for really every belligerent except the United States, into a
war for existence. After Westphalia, the victorious monarchs began to build standing
armies – a militum perpetuum. Many non-political motives existed for the conduct of
warfare – religion, justice, and existence. However, the state monopoly on violence after
Westphalia led to the majority of warfare as efforts to increase power through the
acquisition of land or resources. Standing armies evolved into the tools of the state and
politicians – often utilized for the expansion of the state or its treasury. Although some
challenges from non-state actors confronted the Westphalian state, the depth and breadth
of such attempts were quite minimal.
Warfare viewed through the lenses of Westphalia has become outdated. The
arrangements of the 17th century treaty no longer accurately depict the nature of the
international system in its entirety. Furthermore, the practice of identifying warfare with
the state is a practice becoming anarchistic by the realities of globalization and
deteriorating economic conditions. 144 Specifically, the effort made by Clausewitz to tie
warfare to the state leaves an interesting dilemma – if no state is involved, or only one
state, then what is the nature of the conflict? Such a conflict – most familiar with modern
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students of warfare suggest – can best be labeled a “low intensity conflict.” As war for a
political purpose represents a modern adoption of a more broad expression of organized
violence, one may expect devolution in actors to necessarily include devolution – and
return to the past – pertaining to motives of warfare.

Generations of Warfare
In general, analysts of conflict and military affairs refer to warfare as generational in
nature. 145 The generations of warfare typically correspond to developments in society. 146
The first generation of warfare emerged with the development of gunpowder, the
evolution of a system of states, and new transportation networks developed in order to
satisfy the increased amount of trade. Warfare, during the first generation, was marked by
the participation of the entire population. The first generation emerged from the
organization of the nation-state after the Treaty of Westphalia along with the birth of
professional armies subsidized by the various crowns of Europe. First generation
governments measured wealth in terms of specie and increased both power and relative
power with the acquisition of more and more hard wealth. Indeed, the colonization of the
Americas played a large role in the cementing of state power. The system of mercantilism
found power expressed in economic terms. Mercantilists contended power was best
measured in terms of wealth in the form of a positive balance of trade and policy
reflected those ends. In addition, the colonies added necessary mechanisms for trade and
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finance – again, building the power of the state. Close-order fighting of infantry and
cavalry dominated the first generation of warfare. As one might guess, the period was
marked by defensive dominance. Second generation warfare followed and was
characterized by an increase in state power in terms of the ability to tax. With the
increase in bureaucratic structures, the government usurped more power for use by the
state. The increase in tax receipts allowed a competitive growth in the purchase of arms.
Ultimately, the army with the most and best forms of fire power became victorious in the
second generation of warfare. War grew more and more defensive with advances like the
barbed wire, the machine gun, and the telegraph. In addition, warfare and expressions of
nationalism became more synonymous – as illustrated by the tremendous outpouring of
nationalistic fervor that accompanied the start of World War I. More or less, the
transformation to a second generation of warfare reflected changes in the battle order
between Waterloo and World War I. Industrialization clearly acted as a variable in the
shift to second generation warfare, as well. The grinding deadlock of World War I
symbolized second generation warfare. Efforts to break the deadlock of the trenches
utilized technology as a vehicle in order to transform warfare to a more offensive form.
The first western nation to experiment with the next generation of warfare was Nazi
Germany. Although many refer to the German victory over Poland as the advent of a new
form of warfare, it really reflected the World War I model. The invasion of Poland
included mostly foot soldiers and horse drawn artillery. A full twenty four of the thirty
four German divisions that invaded Poland were of the World War I style. 147 Shortly
after Poland, Germany recognized the need to alter tactics and the May 10, 1940 invasion
of France unveiled the German blitzkrieg. Once again, infantry army divisions made up
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most of the invasion force. However, most of German military leaders organized the units
into Panzer Corps. The fall of France in 1940 brought about a glimpse of the third
generation of warfare. The blitzkrieg form of warfare utilized improved technology in
order to make the expression of war more offensive. Furthermore, the Third Reich’s rapid
movement around the infamous Maginot Line reflected the dominance of the third
generation warfare over second. In short, the blitzkrieg strategy aimed at eliminating
leadership and communications. Overall, the third generation of warfare consisted of
decentralized attacks – like those witnessed in France in May of 1940 – followed by
efforts to wear down the opponent. The attrition of World War I remained – but only
after attempts to minimize the size and strength of opponents through attacks on
command and control. Warfare evolved from the second generation of attrition to the
more proactive model of the third generation.
The march of history continued with several key changes marking the geopolitical
reality since WWII that impact the conduct of warfare – (1) more players – including
those of a nonstate variety – exist on the world stage, (2) the number and diversity of
nations has increased, and (3) the number of stateless actors has also increased. 148 In
addition, warfare is evolving to more closely resemble the corporate and financial
bureaucratic model based upon the consequence of information. 149 As a result, the
hierarchy that characterized societies before WWII is less distinct and networks have
emerged as important organizational forms. In many ways, the three phase model of
guerilla warfare noted by Mao Tse Tung and its emphasis on political power reflects the
use of a network-based approach. The increased political power allows networks to both
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project power beyond borders and undermine the will of the adversary. The resulting
paradigm allowed for a transformation in the conduct of war – networks replaced
hierarchical organizations and an emphasis on political goals supplanted goals of territory
and resources. 150
More recently, experts point to the current generation of warfare as the fourth.
Whereas the previous generations were Trinitarian in nature – state versus state and army
versus army, analysts characterize fourth generation warfare as low-intensity and often
involving non-state actors. Since Westphalia, the effort of non-state actors to engage in
warfare had typically been forbidden and the non-state soldier often treated as a criminal.
However, the effort to defeat both Germany and Japan required the use of all available
resources and insurgency – especially in the form of low-intensity conflict - became an
attractive weapon for use against the Axis powers. 151 Low-intensity conflicts also come
at a cost to established norms – that is, legal norms break down with the low-intensity
and non-Trinitarian forms of warfare. Before World War II, wars typically involved
states and hierarchical organizations. The low-intensity form of conflict, on the other
hand, more often utilizes networks of all sorts – political, economic, social, and religious.
Fourth generation warfare represents a devolution of hierarchical systems. Hence, the
state is no longer the only actor in expressions of warfare. Typical of the low-intensity
and fourth generation of warfare is the Maoist paradigm outlined in his work Guerrilla
Warfare. Mao broke insurgency into three distinct phases. 152 Phase one involved the
building of political networks. Military force was only used for assassinations and
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propaganda purposes. In the second phase, the movement gains strength and consolidates
its political and military networks. Military assets are used for procurement of weapons
and in order to wear down opponents. Mao’s final phase can best be termed the “final
offensive.” Mao’s strategy relied heavily on the notions of networks within the lowintensity form of warfare. In addition, networks engaged the state not for territorial
purposes but in order to accomplish political ends. In the effort to win political ends,
warfare evolved into a contest of the actors’ will to win.
The Vietnam War clarifies how insurgency and low intensity warfare are best
defined as a contest of wills. Ho Chi Minh utilized modified Maoist doctrine in order to
control the ‘tempo and attrition’ of the conflict. 153 Ho sensed the best strategy for victory
in Vietnam involved a long war of attrition followed by an effort to weaken domestic
support in the U.S. for the war effort. Hence, the North Vietnamese concentrated efforts
on political ends. An additional case in point of politically aimed insurgency was the
Nicaraguan insurgency of the 1980’s. 154 The inability of the Sandinistas to apply Che
Guevera’s foco theory in Nicaragua followed by the transformation of the movement to
an urban-based political struggle reveals the ability of low-intensity warfare to quickly
evolve in order to ultimately prevail. The foco strategy wagered that the creation of small
groups of insurgents would ultimately lead to a spontaneous uprising. Guevera’s model
did not transform well to Nicaragua. So, the movement adopted a more urban strategy
and constructed coalitions of opposition to the Somoza regime. The Sandinistas made a
point to minimize their leftist doctrine and capitalized on the alienated business class,
acted to undermine the Somoza regime in international circles, and utilized liberal
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elements of the Catholic Church (“liberation theologists”). The Intifada in the occupied
territories of Gaza and, later, West Bank also spoke volumes about the ability of local
guerrilla leaders to control the tempo and attrition while struggling for a political victory.
Cameras of the international press corps and rocks thrown by children were able to
accomplish more than conventional wars in the 1940’s, 1950’s, 1960’s, and 1970’s. Israel
became framed as an aggressor and the Palestinians as underdogs pursuing ends of selfdetermination.

Contemporary Warfare – Fourth Generation Warfare
Low-intensity conflict, also known as fourth generation warfare and nontrinitarian
warfare has emerged as the dominant form of warfare for the future. Expanded forms of
violence in the form of low-intensity conflicts predict the future of warfare. Using the
variable of state capacity, many political scientists contend the traditional power of the
state has been reduced. Governments cannot provide the promised resource distribution
due to rapid and massive population growth. 155 This causes a polarization of wealth
adding to the failure of many non-western cultures to compete in the post-modern age.
The explosion of post-state organizations undermines the power of the Westphalian
concept of the state. Violence often becomes the only outlet for frustration especially
when all else fails. Hence, the international system likely will produce more violence in
the form of small wars, while fewer wars of the classic larger type. In addition, the wars
played out in the intrastate scale will often reduce the already low levels of legitimacy
and effectiveness of the state.
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The prevalent modern expression of war is not limited to state displays of exercise
of power. The resulting paradigm of warfare is best termed “fourth generation warfare.”
Clearly, fourth generation warfare involves all networks – political, economic, social, and
military. In short, all assets are engaged in order to change a political position of an
adversary. While modern interstate war has rarely led to any change in the social tapestry
of a society, fourth generation warfare often, even if not successful, has led to altered
societal, economic, or political relations.
The evolution of warfare also illustrates the transformation from a modern to a
post-modern society. In many cases, the transformation to post-modernism is trying and
results in violent fissures within a society. Post state organizations factor in a “new”
international system where even the primacy of the state is challenged. Media reports
increase expectations of the state – expectations that often remain unfulfilled. The future
of military and warfare is clear: “…by the middle of the next century, if not before, the
overarching mission of our military will be the preservation of our quality of life.” 156
Generally, the template of conflict in the world has been an overall reduction in
deaths from warfare. The end of the Cold War Era is no exception to the overall pattern –
total war deaths in the four decades commencing with the 1960’s show a reduction from
3,161,337 in the 1960’s to a level of 1,993,554 in the 1990’s.157
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Figure 3 - Total War Deaths by Decade 158
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The total number of wars, however, increased from twenty three in the 1980’s to thirty
one in the 1990’s. Thus, a larger number of conflicts actually yielded a lower number of
overall war deaths. That said, the number of total conflicts and wars per system member
of the 1990’s are significantly lower than the pattern established during the Cold War Era
which, certainly, were significantly lower than those in the previous era. In the end, wars
among states appear to be in the midst of a multi-century decline.
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Figure 4 - Wars Per System Member 159
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Thus, the measures of traditional warfare after the Cold War Era shows a slight increase
in the 1990’s but, at the same time, stands as part and parcel of overall reductions in wars
per system member at the same time of declining net numbers of deaths as a result of
conflicts.
The other side of the coin, however, is the number of terrorist attacks in measured
during the same period. Ultimately, the raw numbers of terror attacks have steadily
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increased since the end of the Cold War. 160 A graphical depiction of numbers of terror
attacks from 1968 until 2003 reveals a troubling post Cold War trend.

Table 5 - Average Number of Terror Attacks per Year 161
Period

Average Terror Attacks Per Year

1968-1989

234.32

1990-1999

436.8

2000-2003

1667.5

The altered international system is allowing for a significant increase in terrorist activity
– attacks by non-state actors. The 1968 to 1989 Cold War data shows an average of
234.32 incidents per year. Correspondingly, the post Cold War Era (1990-2003) shows an
overall mean level of 788.43 attacks per year. In addition, the figure attests to the
growing level of violent activity by terrorists.
Despite the reduced level of deaths as a result of warfare, terror attacks seem to be
growing in their deadliness in the years after the Cold War. Once again, many of the
constraints relative to state actors do not apply to many of the non-state actors.
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Table 6 - Average Number of Deaths per Terror Attack 162
Period

Average Deaths Per Terror Attack

1968-1989

1.05

1990-1999

1.13

2000-2003

1.35

Once again, using 1990 a breaking point, the data shows that terror attacks in the thirty
years of Cold War Era led to an average of 1.05 deaths per attack. In the time of the post
Cold War Era deaths per attack increased to 1.26 – an increase of approximately 20%.
Staten attempts to answer the "why" in the paradigm shift in warfare as an
expression of geopolitical power. Toward these ends, Staten argues that previously:
Stable countries are experiencing religious, ethnic and other internal
conflicts with increasing numbers of separatist movements … some of
these conflicts are ancient and have been the cause of fighting for
hundreds of years. Others are more recent and the result of demographic
shifts, changing political regimes, or religious/ideological shifts. 163
In addition, the declining economies of South West Asia, Africa, South America, and the
Far East have all contributed to an environment of social upheaval that adds a
"combustible mix that is certain to fuel future conflicts in a number of parts of the globe
for the foreseeable future.” 164 Germane to the argument provided by Staten concerning
VNSA's and asymmetric warfare is a theory advanced by Marine Corp Colonel Gary
Wilson that the future of warfare is asymmetric in nature due to the evolving nature of the
terror organization. In short, the strategies used to combat an enemy are dynamic and
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"outside the box." Furthermore, the previously discussed evolution of non-state actors
creates a possibility that non-state actors and state actors ultimately will collide. Then,
the non-state actor, eager to survive, will resort to asymmetric actions. Wilson argues the
structure of terror movements operates in a continual state of change and adaptation in
order to ferment a successful terror program. Wilson compares the evolving terror
structure to bacteria attacked by antibiotics - that is, sooner or later both have so changed
their structure in order to become immune to the impact of the antibiotic. In short, terror
structures "mutate, or change in form, in order to find new ways to survive and better
project the strengths of the terrorists against the weaknesses of opposing civilizations."
James Denney, and ERRI Senior analyst, added the premise:
Global societies traditionally contain a myriad of subcultures that are
based on strongly held ethnic, religious, cultural and ideological beliefs.
In instances where many subcultures interact, new subcultures are
generated in much the same way as a living cell generates another and
another, until finally a new entity is created. Thus, the structural integrity
of a given society becomes increasingly complex. 165
As a result, a clash or conflict of ideologies has increasingly characterized modern
society. Certainly, the incumbent ideologies are holding to the status quo while, many
times, the newly evolved ideologies challenge for hegemony within a system. As a
result, Staten argues that the religious and ethnic cleavages have not been bridged and
vertical integration has been replaced by "horizontal migration and factional polarization
within these societies.” 166 Furthermore, the factional structures, all competing for power,
migrate to polar ends within the community and have created a "breeding ground where
fanatical ethnic and religious tribalism has emerged as fractal subcultures…" 167 Thus, the
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birth of ideologies mixed with the positioning of non-state organizations as transnational
actors creates a very volatile potential for violence.
As the global system evolves, state actors have realized the consequences of
utilizing non-state actors for policy implementation. To be sure, the U.S. campaign in
Afghanistan has certainly supported such a hypothesis. The Taliban - a clear overt
supporter of al-Qaeda - received the full brunt of U.S. Special Forces and was summarily
removed from power. However, the stress is on the "overt support." Many states still
engage in "covert" support of terror groups. To be sure, Sudan allows the basing of terror
groups, Syria supports many of the Middle Eastern groups, and Iran sponsors Hezbollah
activity. Many, many examples of "covert" support of terrorists exist in open source
intelligence. In fact, many may even question the level of covert support of terrorists by
vaunted allies including Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Egypt. Furthermore, a very good
case can be made that the U.S. covertly supported the Irish Republican Army (IRA)
through the collection baskets at bars in Boston to the fundraising picnics in Philadelphia.
Indeed, much of the IRA funding originated in the U.S. In addition, most terror groups,
especially when gaining attention, often resort to tactics aimed at civilians that tend to
undermine much of their support. Plainly, the model of McVeigh and the bombing of the
Murrah building in Oklahoma City apply to many violent movements. To wit, the
violence reaches a point where many of the moderate actors become disenchanted and
leave the movement. In a scientific and calculating manner, the Murrah bombing did
more to alienate Patriot and militia adherents due to its extreme nature than thousands of
law enforcement and government agents would ever be able to do. Thus, a model is
formulated that leads to the very radical elements of movements splintering and forming
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their own organization. The moderates and radicals of the violent political movement no
longer see eye to eye on the "means" even though they still may agree on the "ends." It is
precisely at this point that the threat of asymmetrical warfare or, worse, weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) are often at their most likely stage. The radicals have already
dismissed the external pressure by resorting to civilian attacks and have already
undermined their legitimacy in some manner. As a result, the use of WMD, at this
juncture, is less constrained. Interestingly enough, one of the most significant uses of
chemical terrorism was the sarin gas attack in the Tokyo subway at the hands of Aum
Shinri Kyo. Of note, the Aum Shinri Kyo is an apocalyptic terror movement - wanting to
hasten the end of the world. In terms of movement typology, apocalyptic groups may be
most dangerous because of their beliefs in the end of creation. In any working model of
terrorism, those that want to die and hasten the end of the world clearly lack many of the
internal constraints of other organizations. Staten claims the "devolution of terrorist
organizations into smaller and more compartmentalized groups makes detection of these
small cells increasingly more difficult…" 168 Thus, security responses become
increasingly complex.
The Staten analysis leads to one conclusion with regard to the future of warfare "By the advent of the 21st Century, not only is it likely that many of the conflicts facing
the United States and her allies will be of an asymmetric and devolving nature, and it is
also likely that the threats will come from diverse and differing vectors.” 169 Another
troubling trend in the changing nature of asymmetric warfare is an increased number of
terror casualties. In short, terror organizations are becoming more violent and "… they
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can multiply fear in a civilian population by undertaking even more violent and deadly
tactics.” 170 The goal of many terror attacks quickly is becoming mass murder for the
sake of sending a political message. The travails of Ramzi Yousef - responsible for the
first World Trade Center attack, the Bojinca plots, and a host of other terror plans illustrate the shifting ideology. In short, the symbolic target has become the civilians
themselves. That is, many terrorists aim specifically at civilians in order to send their
message. At the same time, terror groups have become less likely to claim credit for their
attacks. In short, circumstances have been produced in order to introduce attacks of a
size and force heretofore unimagined.
The Staten report also points to the changing nature of WMD as a reason to
reconsider the previous norms of warfare. Citing Richard Betts - Staten argues the
significance of the shift of WMD from weapons of deterrence to offensive weapons of
choice for powers "formerly considered `second-rate` military powers or even non-state
groups.” In addition, Staten refers to Commander James Campbell and the development
of the "Post - Modern Terrorist" as one "free of constraints provided by sponsoring states,
who have discovered that the use of WMD's affords them the ability to wield a
disproportionate power to cause massive numbers of casualties, even within the
continental United States.” 171 Indeed, "non-state actors and post-modern terrorists, with
their apocalyptic visions and belief that they are acting on behalf of some higher power,
are likely to use WMD to maximize their kill ratios and send a larger and more fearsome
message to their perceived enemies.” 172 Clearly, Staten pointed to a changing of the
guard in the international political system in 1998. In fact, Staten contends that those
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analysts who "want to continue to live in the comfortable past of a largely bi-polar,
superpower - driven global situation may be in for a rude awakening as the nature of
asymmetric conflict unfolds in the coming decade.” 173
In fact, OBL is directly quoted with regard to the use of asymmetric warfare "Nevertheless, it must be obvious to you that, due to the imbalance of power between our
armed forces and the enemy forces, a suitable means of fighting must be adopted i.e.
using fast moving light forces that work under complete secrecy." 174 In addition, OBL's
war against the United States best can be described as multi-dimensional in that its goals
and objectives are political, economic, and religious. The war is aimed “… at the symbols
and institutions of American political power.” 175 Ultimately, the terror attacks of
September 11 fit the archetype of political violence. As such, the attacks and the political
effort belong in the domain of asymmetric behavior. Bin Laden, like any politician,
strives to influence a particular policy and strategic outcome. Bin Laden, however,
employs significantly violent inartistic proofs. The violence against the United States is
no different in means and pursued ends than OBL’s flirtations, financing, and
participation in violent political expressions in Chechnya, Algeria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia,
Kosovo, India, Indonesia, Palestine, Yemen, and the Philippines. In fact, many
similarities exist between OBL and the revolutionary figures of past history - "whereas
Lenin fought for a new social - economic communist state, bin Laden projected a vision
of pure Islamic caliphate.” 176 In addition, the attacks of September 11 "were designed to
encourage the `good believers` and the `strong believers` to support `the greatest Jihad in
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the history of Islam’." 177 Such a message is political in nature and asymmetric in means.
Many believed OBL different than the typical terrorist because of his de facto control of
the Afghan government. However, it may be more relevant to view OBL under the
auspices of the new form of terrorism as applied to contemporary geopolitical exigencies.
That said, OBL's Afghan operation clearly demonstrates the long held tenants of guerilla
warfare. For example, upon finding that direct confrontation of U.S backed Northern
Alliance forces simply was not advantageous, the al-Qaeda and Taliban remnants of alQaeda and the Taliban forces took the advice of Mao Zedong - the revered expert in
guerilla warfare - and capitalized on "the ability to run away" and get "out of passivity
and regain the initiative.” 178 Within the framework of OBL's campaign, Chipman
derived a more contemporary and appropriate operational definition of terrorism
reflecting the evolving nature of asymmetric warfare as "…warfare deliberately waged
against civilians with the purpose of destroying their will to support either leaders or
policies that the agents of such violence find objectionable.” 179 The March 11 terror
attacks in Spain are a germane case in point. That is, the attacks in Madrid, Spain on the
commuter lines were an asymmetric attempt to influence the parliamentary elections to
be held several days later. The end goal was to ensure a socialist victory and the
splintering of the coalition in Iraq. September 11, Chipman argues, was the beginning of
round two. In short, the grand strategy of OBL was "to provoke a clash between West
and Middle East cultures by initiating a guerilla war.” 180 As such, OBL fit the model of a
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non-state actor utilizing asymmetric means in order to achieve a political goal at the
international level.
An examination of asymmetric warfare and deterrence allows for an appreciation
of the strategic advantages of asymmetric international conduct. Typically, deterrence is
one of two broad forms - a "threat of retaliation" or "denial" in order to prevent an attack
- and in order to project deterrence and avoid armed conflict an actor must have a
requisite capability and strength of will. 181 A lack of either capability or will makes the
deterrent threat not credible. Simply put, an actor without power cannot use power as a
deterrent. And, an actor holding power but not willing to use it makes for a poor
deterrent as well. Needless to say, a state-actor must recall the words of the Romans - si
vis parem, para bellum (If you seek peace, prepare for war). 182 That said, security expert
Roger Barnett suggests deterrence irrelevant in a conflict featuring an irrational actor or
one simply committed to inflict as much pain and disaster as possible. In addition,
deterrence is also impacted by a series of other variables. That is, deterrence is
undermined when specific assets are eliminated as potential targets. 183 Indeed, an
asymmetric response to U.S. military action has often been the hiding of munitions in
mosques and the use of civilians as shields. Thus, the fact that those targets are off limits
to U.S. forces reduces the deterrent. Furthermore, a series of variables impact the
credibility of deterrence - deterrence is not credible if - (1) "defender's retaliatory
capability was not credible," (2) deterrence involves a question of will, (3) credibility is
undermined if the attacker believes the said attack will be successful, (4) "the attack was
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irrational," (5) "the attack was not deterrable in the first place" in the form of attacks
made merely to inflict casualties or motivated by revenge.184
Clearly, asymmetric means by non-state actors minimizes and may even nullify
the value of deterrence. A point by point examination alludes to the lack of utility in
using deterrence versus non-state actors. First, the defender must possess the capability of
retaliation. Such a capability previously was measured within the international system in
terms of military and police strength and power. A current usage, however, is much more
complex. A capability of retaliation often becomes difficult when the defender cannot
clearly identify and locate the attacker. As argued, non-state actors thrive and exist in the
fringes and “grey” areas of the international system. The option of an immediate
counterstrike often does not pertain to deterrence of non-state actors. Thus, the capability
of retaliation may be limited until the actor is located. Even then, retaliation must
frequently be in conjunction or despite host states. Second, deterrence involves the
question of “will.” That said, asymmetric non-state actors have a unique ability to wear
down the will of governments and their constituents. Furthermore, the often radical
ideology of violent non-state actors lends itself to an iron will not often encountered in
pluralistic societies. Next, credibility of deterrence “is undermined if the attacker believes
the said attack will be successful.” 185 The advantage of attacks by non-state actors is that,
ultimately, many are ideologically based. In point of fact, strict ideologists believe in a
macro-view and “larger picture” of ultimate ideological success. Thus, deterrence cannot
be completely successful against ideological non-state actors. Finally, many of the attacks
launched by violent non-state actors fit the very definition of “not deterrable” or
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“irrational” by design. The frequent use of suicide bombings fairly illustrates such a
concept. Hence, the asymmetric behavior of non-state actors often cannot be deterred.
Furthermore, an examination of deterrence also reveals that it "is wholly
defensive.” 186 As a defensive measure deterrence must necessarily be specific. In fact,
Barnett argues, "the nastier and less ambiguous the deterrent threat - backed up by
requisite capability - presumably, the higher the level of deterrence.” 187 At the same
time, policy makers must realize that deterrence should never be a policy objective.
Surely a peaceful system may be an end objective. However, deterrence is merely a
vehicle in order to achieve such an ends and not the ends itself. Barnett argues,
conversely, that stability can really never be a policy objective. The system is in constant
flux and a rigid status quo is not possible. 188 In fact, Barnett defines stability as "a fool's
quest" and the question facing policy makers are not if a system changes but how violence or nonviolence - a system changes. 189 In total, the operational definitions
discussed are relevant in the much larger picture because "wars today can be irreversible
in their consequence.” 190 With that in mind, the role of deterrence in such an
international arena is of significant importance.
The United States is a clear example of a state vulnerable to "asymmetric
strategies and tactics [which] undermine conventional and technological advantage.” 191
In short, the United States represents a power with superior military manpower facing
threats from inferior powers - often in the form of a non-state actor. As a result, the
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future of warfare suggests that the U.S. will face asymmetric conflicts. In fact, the
enemies of the U.S. are aimed at simultaneously reducing the power of the U.S. while
increasing their own. In fact, the Defense Intelligence Agency defines the "emerging
threat paradigm" as a “more complex [notion] than the bi-polar structure that the United
States faced a decade ago; in this environment, the United States faces partners,
competitors, adversaries, and renegades.” 192 The asymmetric threats emanate from
"economic volatility, the political and security implications of inequalities, and the
growing threat from weapons of mass destruction …"the asymmetric approach of
potential adversaries include the notion of the Western reluctance to take casualties
and/or create collateral damage. In addition, asymmetric threats also recognize time,
will, and the power of defense as potential vehicles of conflict.” 193
As a global actor and hegemon with a significant profile, the United States is a
target in all areas of the world. Yet, any attack on U.S. interests must also include a
corresponding counterattack that will not be viewed as too “heavy handed.” Otherwise,
the asymmetric threat wins the battle of public opinion and likely gains more political
capital. At the same time, the asymmetric actor attempts to “affect the great power’s
domestic cohesion, imposing a continual aggregation of costs on its adversaries.” 194 That
said, the costs envisioned are not merely limited to military assets and asymmetric attacks
are bound by threats of mass casualties. As such, the strategic advantage of an
“asymmetric attack designed to inflict both terror and unacceptable losses would be just
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as likely to target civilian targets at home as the military abroad.” 195 Furthermore,
according to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the threat of an asymmetric attack looms larger
because globalization has led to “the ability of state and non-state actors to leap ahead
and acquire means previously unattainable.” 196 In addition, the asymmetric threat cannot
be strictly limited to military targets. A comprehensive threat analysis of an asymmetric
attack includes both means and ends.
Major Robert M. Cassidy also argues the likelihood of asymmetric warfare as "…
the most probably form of conflict the United States may face.” 197 Cassidy argues four
grand level reasons for the future of conflict tied to asymmetry - (1) Western powers
stand unmatched in terms of military hardware, (2) The cultural and economic ties and
globalization suggests Western states will not likely engage in warfare amongst
themselves, (3) The Gulf War of 1991 showed the frustration with facing Western forces
on the traditional battlefield and (4) The resulting analysis suggests that the "United
States and its European allies will employ their firepower and technology in the less
developed world against ostensibly inferior adversaries employing asymmetric
approaches.” 198 According to Cassidy, the asymmetric approach suggests the bumper
sticker mentality of "victory or death." Simply, the notion of losing is often not
acceptable within the definition of asymmetric warfare. 199
A cursory examination of the attacks of September 11 frame the multiple
outcomes of bin Laden’s attack with the domain of asymmetric warfare. In short, the 9/11
attack caused approximately $40 billion in economic damage in the area of the World
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Trade Center alone. 200 Indirect results of the attack can be estimated as a net impact of
F

$100 billion on the gross domestic product of the United States. 201 In addition, the impact
F

and “effects of a weak U.S. economy are quickly transmitted around the globe.” 202 In
addition, the attacks resulted in uncertainly that may have impacted the rate of domestic
economic recovery. 203 Ultimately, the attack essentially slowed the rates of global
interaction and trade. 204 In short, the attacks of 9/11 were deadly but also claimed multidimensions of asymmetric impact.
In many ways, the international geopolitical system has changed from the days of
balance of power in the bi-polar Soviet - American relationship. Varied factors have led
to the growth of non-state actors that behave much like a state actor in the power
continuum. That said, the future of warfare lies in the asymmetric activities of the nonstate actor. Indeed, the evolving arrangement of the international system calls for
identifiable change in the methods used in power politics. Future warfare will consist of
small scale operations in the form of “an increasing number of ‘brush fire’ wars, counterinsurgency campaigns, hostage rescue operations, ‘drug wars,’ and low intensity conflicts
…” in addition to the “urban combat and ‘peacekeeping operations’” that have emerged
as “the new paradigm of conflict … as more failed states emerge and peace enforcement
and nation-building become staples of the senior military diet.” 205 Instead, the future
conflict will primarily be the engaging of non-state actors in an asymmetric theatre.
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Chapter 6
The Evolving Power of Non-State Actors: A Case Study of Political Islam
Throughout this effort, I have maintained that the changes in the international system and
the evolving nature of the state have resulted in increased power for the non-state actor.
In fact, the last chapter discussed the evolution of warfare within the international system
and the increased role of non-state actors in the most significant of all state enterprises –
the making of war. In this chapter, I will detail the emergence of al-Qaeda through its
parent movement the Muslim Brotherhood. With this examination, I hope to show how
the changes in the state and system had a significant impact on the Muslim Brotherhood
and allowed a different development path for al-Qaeda than for the Muslim Brotherhood.
As a result, an interesting historical case study of the Muslim Brotherhood and its
transformation to an international actor in the ultimate form of al-Qaeda offers significant
perspective into the emerging role of non-state actors. At the same time, the Muslim
Brotherhood offers an examination of a contemporary problem in international security.
A great deal of insight into fourth generation warfare and its link with Maoist
doctrine can be inferred from a discussion of the institutional growth of al-Qaeda. Bin
Laden and Azzam, even in the founding of al-Qaeda, concentrated on the necessity of an
Islamic rapid reaction force. Building on the successes of Afghan mujahadeen versus the
Soviets, bin Laden and Azzam created the necessary framework to assist Muslims in
Mao-like guerilla struggles globally. Ultimately, a schism between Azzam and bin Laden
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left the future of the organization in the hands of bin Laden and his Egyptian proxy Dr.
Ayman al-Zawahiri. The organizational development of religious schools, finance
committees, and military committees harkened to Mao’s phases of insurgency. To wit,
when faced with repression from Middle Eastern regimes, bin Laden recognized the
value of attacking – both verbally and physically – the U.S. In a true fourth generation
model, bin Laden exploited the political openings provided by repressive local regimes to
allow a turning of bin Laden’s anger to the U.S. Bin Laden modified and manipulated the
“diversionary war theory” in order to allow al-Qaeda to evolve. 206 Finally, the presence
of friendly nation-states as bases in the substance of Sudan and Afghanistan allowed for
virtually unmolested growth. 207
In order to fully understand the attacks of September 11 and the role of al-Qaeda
as a non-state actor, one must first analyze the movement's beginnings. Clearly, the
historical record shows that the foundations of political Islam and the Brotherhood
movement existed for a long time before widespread targeting of the United States and
Western interests. The intervening variable, the sparks that lit the Islamic bomb, was the
fall of the Soviet Union - and the change in the international system - as well as the rapid
acceleration of globalization.
Many of the perceived injustices of the Islamic world are rooted in thousands of
years of history. However, a key watershed in Islam was Kemal Ataturk's reign in
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modern Turkey that resulted in the secularization of the former Ottoman Empire. Since
Ataturk, the movement of Political Islam has devoted much energy to the realization of a
"new" caliphate - or new Islamic power. Such voices emerged in the 1920's as the
foundations for the Muslim Brotherhood and a more broadly defined movement. In
1920, Maulana Maudoodi began to call for the emergence of a new caliphate centered in
Afghanistan based upon the precepts of the Koran. Maudoodi argued that all Muslims in
India should attend to the development of the Islamic caliphate.
By 1929, the early calls for an Islamic caliphate began to hit home with many
Muslims. Hassan al-Banna created the Muslim Brotherhood (Al-Ikhwan Al-Muslimoon)
in Egypt. Al-Banna and six others pledged to work for Islam and launch jihad. Needless
to say, the dream of the Muslim Brotherhood centered upon the reestablishment of an
Islamic empire. Toward these ends, the West was considered an enemy of Islam and was
the embodiment of a modern day crusader posing a serious threat to the Islamic way of
life. Al-Banna contended the crusaders must be defeated and the mass Islamization of
society was the appropriate strategy. As a result, the Muslim Brotherhood worked
extensively to educate the masses through a series of Brotherhood centers. In addition,
the Brotherhood also acted as a sort of social safety net implementing programs of charity
and welfare in Muslim communities. The strategy was to win the grassroots support of
society before the launching of a jihad versus the crusaders.
Indeed, the message of the Muslim Brotherhood soon became ubiquitous in the
Islamic society of Egypt. 208 Within six years of the founding of the Brotherhood, some
fifty branches were active in Egypt and within ten years more than two thousand
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branches were active. In addition, branches of the Brotherhood were created in Syria,
Sudan, Jordan, and other Islamic states worldwide. In fact, 1929 featured a rebellion of
the Saudi Brotherhood which was defeated by 1930. By 1942, at the sixth Congress of
the Muslim Brotherhood, al-Banna called for the destruction of all political parties within
Egypt so that the country could be ruled by Islamic law - sharia.
Clearly, the Brotherhood was growing both stronger and more aggressive. In
1945, the Brotherhood led xenophobic riots throughout Egypt. Anything foreign, but
especially Western, was targeted. That same year, the Brotherhood began a policy of
political assassinations of the enemies of Islam. Any politicians not sympathetic to the
Brotherhood were marked for possible assassination. The Brotherhood also created a
branch coined the "secret apparatus." Essentially, the "secret apparatus" was nothing
more than a network of terrorist cells. They worked to buy weapons, train as fighters and
assassins, and to infiltrate the Egyptian police and await the commencement of the jihad.
Finally, threatened so much by the Brotherhood, Prime Minister Mahmud Nukrashi of
Egypt would outlaw the Brotherhood in 1948. In 1949, Hassan al-Banna was
assassinated and the Egyptian government was widely viewed as the culprit.
By the 1950's and 1960's the Muslim Brotherhood began to regroup and
consolidate. The Brotherhood had become illegal in Egypt and was also not welcome in
Syria and Iraq; so, many members fled to Saudi Arabia. The ideals of the Brotherhood
quickly spread through the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Brotherhood members quickly
blended into Saudi society and even began to fill important Kingdom positions. Soon,
the Brotherhood members took up positions as imams, teachers, professors, and key posts
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within the department of education. Within the ministry, the Brotherhood officials began
to assume the role of selecting textbooks and programs of study.
In short order, the Brotherhood's radical forms of Islam became part of Saudi
culture. The Wahhabi movement allied themselves with the Brotherhood members. In
fact, the Brotherhood's involvement in Saudi education signaled a shift in the priorities of
the Wahhabi movement. That is, until the arrival of the Brotherhood, the Wahhabi
movement was less concerned with politics and more concerned with aesthetic
appearances of devout morals and religious observations. The Wahhabis fought for strict
interpretations of the Koran and for an implementation of Sharia within the context of
staid and Puritanical beliefs. The Saudi government began using the vast proceeds of oil
sales in order to facilitate the spread of Islam.
By 1951, Egypt had become very nervous with the state of government. In an
effort to soothe political differences, the Muslim Brotherhood was no longer outlawed in
terms of existence but was strictly permitted from becoming involved in political
questions. Regional politics, however, would bear the heavy stamp of Brotherhood
involvement in the 1950's. The "free officers" movement overthrew King Farouk of
Egypt in 1952 with help from the Brotherhood. A host of regional events, however,
revealed the long reach of the Brotherhood. In 1951 a former Prime Minister of Lebanon
was assassinated in Amman, Jordan; King Abdullah of Jordan was assassinated in 1951;
Islamic Liberation parties were founded - and outlawed - in Lebanon and Jordan: and, in
1954, the Brotherhood attempted to assassinate Nasser. Once again, Egypt outlawed the
Brotherhood and Nasser overhauled the Egyptian Secret Service in an effort to eliminate
any Brotherhood members.
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After al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb emerged as the next voice of the Muslim
Brotherhood. Qutb's book, Ma'alim Fi'l - Tareeq (translated to "Signposts" or
"Milestones") became a rallying point for many in the Brotherhood. Qutb argued for the
imposition of a Muslim government and defined the steps necessary toward the
implementation of such a plan. After spending time in the United States as a student,
Qutb had arrived at the conclusion of a Muslim government as necessary, and he began to
work closely with the Muslim Brotherhood. At that point, the Brotherhood aligned with
the "free officers" movement evolving in Egypt - a movement that included Nasser and
Sadat and advocated the overthrowing of the Egyptian monarchy. In fact, Sadat would
refer to Qutb as "the ideologue" of the revolution. Qutb's participation would ultimately
be minimized which would first create a rift between Qutb and Nasser and that would
ultimately be resolved with the August 1966 assassination of Qutb.
In 1967, the Six Day War acted as a radicalizing factor in Arab opinion. The
Saudi government began to provide funding for a host of political movements inside the
kingdom - many of which were radical in nature and pushed for Political Islam.
Interestingly, new non-state actors, financed by Saudi oil money, began to question the
legitimacy of Saudi rule and of the Wahhabi bargain. The public opinion in Egypt, as
well, was disappointed in the inability to defeat Israel. As a result, the Muslim
Brotherhood made clear advances in terms of public opinion throughout Egypt.
The 1970's brought further expansion of the Brotherhood. First, increased
revenues in Saudi oil money gave the Brotherhood the necessary resources to expand. In
addition, the disparity between the haves and have-not's allowed the Brotherhood to
expand among poor and disaffected members of society. With the Soviet invasion of
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Afghanistan in 1979, wealthy Saudi financier Osama bin Laden began to emerge as a key
actor in the international Brotherhood. Bin Laden arrived in Afghanistan and began
recruiting Egyptians, Algerians, Lebanese, Kuwaitis, Turks, and Tunisians by, according
to his own claims, the thousands. Bin Laden provided weapons and financial support. In
addition, bin Laden would establish the Islamic National Front - a group of volunteers
recruited to fight the Soviets and supported by U.S. funding. In the course of the war,
over twenty five thousand Islamic guerillas from more than fifty nations would fight the
Soviets. The war against the Soviets, through the prompting of the United States, would
become Pan-Islam's first holy war in nearly 800 years. During the course of the war, the
United States would provide $3 billion for the anti-Soviet jihad.
In addition, bin Laden quickly became a player in the war against the Soviets in
an international sense. With his mentor, Sheikh Abdullah Assam, bin Laden worked for
the Alkhifa movement. Within the context of an emerging international movement, the
Alkhifa movement established offices in Brooklyn, New York - the Office of Services for
the Mujahadeen - located at the Al-Farooq Mosque. The center also was responsible for
shipping weapons to Hamas, providing forged identification documents, the
counterfeiting of money, and also serving as a recruitment center for jihad in Bosnia, the
Philippines, Egypt, Algeria, Kashmir, Palestine, and other areas of the world.
The international jihad movement, founded on the tenants of the Muslim
Brotherhood, continued to be active in regional politics. In 1979, Juhayman al-Utaybi, a
supporter of the Brotherhood, and two hundred followers seized Mecca - only to be
defeated. Also, 1979 brought the Islamic Revolution in Iran. Although Shiite in nature,
the revolution launched in Iran was partially based on the work of Muhammad Faraj
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(Neglected Duty) and the argument that the Brotherhood was not active enough in jihad.
Ironically, Neglected Duty served as an ideological underpinning for the views of Osama
bin Laden - even to the point that much of the material found in the 1996 bin Laden call
for jihad versus Saudi Arabia heavily borrowed from the work. In addition, Faraj would
found the Egyptian Jihad based upon Neglected Duty. Ultimately, Imam Zawahari would
be heavily influenced by Faraj's work and join Egyptian Jihad.
The 1980's would also bring a host of significant terror groups founded upon the
ideals of Political Islam. The Jamaat ul-Fuqra, under the leadership of Pakistani Sheikh
Mubarik Ali Gilani, emerged in Pakistan and the United States. Ul-Fuqra, ultimately,
would boast a membership list that included American Clement Rodney Hampton-El, a
participant in the World Trade Center attacks of 1993, who would be convicted for his
part in a plot to destroy a series of New York landmarks. According to United States
authorities, ul-Fuqra would be credited with seventeen homicides and thirteen fire
bombings in the United States. Qibla emerged, under the leadership of Achmad Cassiem,
devoted to the establishment of an Islamic state in South Africa. Al-Ittihad al-Islamiya,
of Somalia, emerged as an Islamic movement. Syria destroyed the town of Hama, killing
five to ten thousand, in an effort to control the Syrian Brotherhood. Egyptian Jihad
assassinated Anwar Sadat in 1981 and major attacks sponsored by Iran under the auspices
of Hezbollah were launched toward the United States. Finally, Osama bin Laden and
Abdallah Azzam, a member of the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood, founded Maktab alKhidamat (MAK) in order to funnel fighters and funds to Afghanistan through Peshawar,
Pakistan. Analyst Steven Emerson suggested Azzam was the first to call for the so-called
global jihad. As a result, a non-state actor with a transnational scope emerged.
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In late 1987, Sheikh Ahmad Yassin founded HAMAS as a branch of the
Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood. HAMAS's formula was one devoted to the destruction
of Israel and the creation of an Islamic fundamentalist government under the rule of
sharia. HAMAS constructed a foundation of radicalism that had been maintained by the
Muslim Brotherhood for six decades. In addition, the Islamic Congress had run the
Brotherhood's social and educational institutions out of local mosques. Yassin, as leader
of the Islamic Congress, quickly transferred the social network to HAMAS.
Yet another watershed in the International Muslim Brotherhood movement was
the 1989 military coup in Sudan. As a result, the National Islamic Front, under the
control of Dr. Hasan al-Turabi came to power. Turabi had been leader of the Sudanese
Muslim Brotherhood movement as early as the 1960's. Turabi's vision was one of
extending Islam to restore the former Caliphate. The Sudanese Brotherhood enacted a
carefully planned strategy in order to take the reigns of Sudan's government. The
Sudanese Brotherhood recruited from the educated classes and, at the same time,
appealed to democratic ideals. As the lower rungs of society became more and more
economically disenfranchised, Turabi worked to construct a social safety network
founded upon the ideals of Islam. And, to help finance the expansion, Turabi developed
an Islamic banking system. Political Islam - in Sudan - was constructed on wellconsidered economic, political, and social platforms. The masses began to view the
Brotherhood as guardians of the values of antiquity and the gatekeepers to the future.
The movement quickly mushroomed. In addition, the movement grew both vertically
through social classes and horizontally through societies. Several factors allowed for both
horizontal and vertical growth of Political Islam and the Brotherhood. These factors
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included the changes in both the international system and characteristics of the state
previously discussed in this effort.
Once in control of the leadership roles of government in Sudan, Turabi claimed a
virtual monopoly - he controlled society from the position of leadership elite as well as
from the grassroots with his Islamic charity network. Soon, however, Dr. Turabi
discovered a kindred soul, of sorts, in Osama bin Laden. Bin Laden filled both the role of
funding and providing a revered figurehead credited with the successful triumph over the
"godless" Soviets. Certainly, bin Laden portrayed a man blessed by Allah. And,
ironically enough, bin Laden possessed a battle tested and ready- trained military force.
Recognizing the need to engage in force as a "means," Turabi and President Bashir
excitedly welcomed bin Laden and his organization. Bin Laden's rhetoric, as well, was of
a unified Islamic movement to purge the corrupt dictators of the Islamic world and return
to the caliphate. Bin Laden, conversely, saw Sudan as the perfect place and opportunity
to expand his own organization. The numbers of disenchanted increased polarization of
the classes continued. Political Islam, however, intensified the legitimacy of the
movement by appealing to the grinding Palestinian issue.
The relation between terrorism and state failure is a particularly important
dimension of the current global security environment. Bin Laden’s use of Sudan as a base
for militant Islam allowed for the necessary space and freedom to grow organizationally
and provides an excellent illustration of the impact of a failed or failing states in a far
away region on the rest of the world. Although not a failed state at the time, Sudan
certainly fit many of the definitions for a failing state. Thus, bin Laden’s organization
was able to expand in terms of scope and operations. Indeed, without Sudan as a base of
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operations, bin Laden’s Afghani mujahadeen would have extended all over the Arab
world – and made a less concentrated threat – “… over time, their [Afghani mujahadeen]
strength would have waned and they would have had difficulty communicating and
coordinating their efforts … without Sudan, bin Laden could have not incubated the
networks that have caused such devastation.” 209
In 1991, bin Laden had arrived in Sudan, a group trained by Sudan launched the
first attacks in a renewed Algerian conflict, and fighters were trained for use in Kashmir.
Dr. Hassan al-Turabi – a Sudanese adherent of the militant Islamic movement, bin Laden,
and Egyptian Ayman al-Zawahiri all constructed close relationships. Eventually, alZawahiri would manage the international finances of bin Laden and Turabi as they
engaged in a series of terrorist attacks. In 1994 alone, Bin Laden trained 5000
mujahadeen in Sudan’s terror training camps. And, at the same time, bin Laden worked
for organizational legitimacy by providing financial help and assistance in rebuilding
Sudanese infrastructure: a highway from Khartoum to Port Sudan; a repaving of a 500
km highway from Sudan to Shendi and Atbara; construction on the Rusayris
hydroelectric dam; a million dollar capitalization effort for the Shamali Bank; a 1993
loan of $8 million to finance imports; $1 million in contributions to the Pan Arab Islamic
Conference (PAIC); a $2 million expense in resettling Afghan mujahadeen from Pakistan
to Sudan, and the construction (“at his own expense”) of 23 terrorist camps.
The terror partnership of Turabi and bin Laden produced a litany of attacks.
Agents were trained to assassinate Qaddafi; HAMAS operatives were trained that began
– as early as 1995 – suicide bombings in Israel; Egyptian militants used Sudan as a base
of operations to attack the Mubarak regime; the Sudanese counsel in Beirut was involved
209
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with the assassination of a Lebanese politician as well as an attempted bombing of the
Egyptian embassy. The list also includes a 1993 attempted attack on U.S. troops in
Yemen en route to Somalia. The Sudanese government supplied weapons to Somali
warlord General Muhammad Aidid and bin Laden provided reinforcements with the
movement of 3,000 mujahadeen to assist Aidid – at a cost of $3 million. The PAIC,
through Turabi and bin Laden, agreed, in 1993, to supply fighters to Bosnia. In 1996, the
PAIC authorized a plan to assassinate Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and at least five
attempts were made to fulfill the obligation. Mujahadeen were sent to fight in Chechnya
and Tajikistan while al-Qaeda operatives in Sudan trained members of the Filipino Moro
Front and a jihad office was opened in Baku, Azerbaijan. 210 Only in 1996 did
cooperation between bin Laden and Sudan begin to wane. Bin Laden moved to
Afghanistan, the policy of a Sudanese “open door” immigration policy for all Arabs
ended, and Egyptian militants were ordered out of the country. Bin Laden’s network,
however, had grown to a point of self-sufficiency and stood primed to utilize its next host
state – Afghanistan.
Not only did bin Laden construct a network of terror, he also created the
necessary organizations to finance his efforts. 211 In fact, bin Laden acquired a significant
business empire while in Sudan. Bin Laden organized an international trading company;
owned – with the government of Sudan – a construction company; held title to the AlThemar Agricultural Company, which employed 4,000 and harvested a one million acre
farm; gained exclusive monopoly over major Sudanese exports that included gum arabic,
corn, sunflower, and sesame; claimed a fruit and vegetable concern called Blessed Fruits,
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Inc.; sold sweets and honeys through his Al-Ikhals enterprise; owned a trucking company
named Al-Qudrut; and, also, owned both a leather tannery and furniture making
company. Finally, bin Laden provided the $50 million funding for the Al-Shamad Islamic
Bank.
In addition to the economic consolidation of the bin Laden network, Sudan also
allowed for a political consolidation of al-Qaeda. 212 Turabi organized the Islamic
People’s Congress in 1995 and it was at this meeting that Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda
aligned with Imad Mugniyeh and Hezbollah. As a result, the historic disagreement of
Sunni versus Shiite Islam took a back seat to the more international struggle against Israel
and the United States. Iran began to ship explosives to al-Qaeda and bin Laden’s
“terrorist corporation” formed links with Egypt’s Islamic Group, Egyptian Jihad, the
Armed Islamic Group of Algeria, the Libyan Fighting Group, the Yemeni Saif Islamic
Jannubi, and the Syrian Jamaat e-Jihal al-Suri. Hassan al-Turabi and Osama bin Laden
held many of the same beliefs at a time when Sudan was perilously close to being a failed
state. President Bashir was ultimately forced to reign in both Turabi, who currently is in
prison, and bin Laden, who moved his entourage to Afghanistan.
At the time of consolidation within the Mid-Eastern al-Qaeda organization, the
Southeast Asian branches of al-Qaeda were busy as well. Al-Qaeda also began its
expansion and conglomeration in Southeast Asia in 1991. A familiar pattern rang true.
That is, al-Qaeda made an effort in "… co-opting individuals and groups, establishing
independent cells, and finding cause with local militias.” 213 In fact, the more localized
Islamic movements of Aceh, Thailand, and Myanmar had very little interest in the
212

Ibid.
Zachary Abuza. “Tentacles of Terror: Al-Qaeda’s Southeast Asian Network.” Contemporary Southeast
Asia 24 (December 2002): 428.

213

118

creation of an international movement. Al-Qaeda, however, utilized common historical
links and the Afghan experience as a shared identity. 214 In the end, al-Qaeda took
advantage of the "economic dispossession", "failure of secular education", and "lack of
political freedom" in order to create a cadre of willing volunteers within the madrasah
system. Furthermore, the state of Southeast Asia fit the necessary prerequisites for alQaeda organizational growth. 215 That is, Southeast Asia were filled with "countries of
convenience" noted for the ability to obtain visas easily, "lax financial oversights,"
"porous borders", "weak central government control", "endemic government corruption",
and "a vast supply of illicit arms.” 216 Notably, within Southeast Asia, "Every state, with
the exception of Laos and Brunei, produces small arms and ammunition. They are also
home to several leading arms brokers, who exploit legal loopholes in the sale of weapons
from legal sources (government owned or contracted firms).” 217 In addition, the
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development Financial Task Force
characterizes the state of Thailand, Myanmar, and the Philippines all as "money
laundering states.” 218
Ultimately, the al-Qaeda organizational plan was quite simple within the
Southeast Asian states. To wit, the al-Qaeda organizational strategy showed "in addition
to establishing independent cells, al-Qaeda was brilliant in its co-optation of other groups,
those with a narrow domestic agenda and in bringing them into al-Qaeda's structure.” 219
Ironically, al-Qaeda utilized the madrasah system - mainly in Pakistan- in order to
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indoctrinate recruits, return them to their own country, and set up local madrasah to serve
as recruiting centers. 220 The system allowed the jihadist ideology to quickly spread
through Southeast Asia.
Al-Qaeda hierarchy remained on site and also worked to supplement the
madrasah system. In fact, bin Laden's brother in law - Mohammed Jammal Khalifa created the Islamic International Relief Organization (IIRO) in 1991 in order to serve
Islamic dogma in the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, and Taiwan. 221 Al-Qaeda
operative Wali Khan made trips to the Philippines, Malaysia, Hong Kong, and Thailand
and senior al-Qaeda leader Omar al-Faruq worked to "establish links with Muslim
militants in Thailand and Myanmar.” 222 A cursory look at a handful of al-Qaeda tied
Southeast Asian organizations attests to the organization expertise of al-Qaeda.
The organizational structure of al-Qaeda that has widely been written about in
regions of the Middle East and Central Asia is evident in a glance of its structure in
Southeast Asia. Once again, the key variables that have allowed al-Qaeda influenced
groups to become non-state actors in Southeast Asia appear to be much the same as in
other parts of the world – globalization and the inability of the state to provide goods and
services and maintain a monopoly over power.
The most commonly cited extension of al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia is Jemaah
Islamiya (JI). JI’s goal is to create an Islamic state that includes Indonesia, Malaysia,
parts of the Philippines, and southern Thailand. The JI is alleged to have carried out the
October 2002 bombing in Bali and the August 2003 bombing of the J.W. Marriott hotel.
Indeed, it is the freedom of movement inherent to Southeast Asia that allowed JI to
220

Abuza, 432.
Abuza, 436.
222
Abuza, 442-445.
221

120

operate in Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, and others. Key
personnel in JI have been linked to bin Laden and include Hambali and Abu Bakar
Bashir.
Yet, the story of JI is even more international in scope. In a study of Southeast
Asian terrorism for the Monterey Institute for International Studies, Captain Wayne
Turnbull developed a working list of many jihadi movements in the region. 223
Significantly, all feature similar connections with al-Qaeda or JI and have been able to
expand due to the changing international system and the freedom of movement associated
with those changes. For example, the Arakan Rohingya National Organization is a group
of Burmese living in Bangladesh that is committed to independence of the Arakan region
of Myanmar. Other notable militant groups relating to Myanmar include the Ommat
Liberation Front, Kawthoolei Muslim Liberation Front, and the Muslim Organization of
Burma. Group 272 encompasses the 272 survivors from Indonesia that fought in
Afghanistan. The Guragan Mujahidin Pattani is a Thai Muslim extremist group. A
number of Indonesian groups were founded by or based upon the teachings of Abu Bakar
Bashir – the Kumpulan Militan Malaysia, Laskar Jihad, Laskar Mujahidin, Majelis
Mujahidin Indonesia, and Rabitatul Mujahidin. In the Philippines, the Moro Islamic
Liberation Front and the Abu Sayyaf group have been quite active. All share common
cause with al-Qaeda’s vision.
Again, the discussion with regard to Southeast Asian elements of Al-Qaeda
influenced groups is, admittedly, limited. The utility of such a discussion is in how the
growth of these organizations has mirrored al-Qaeda in that it has been international in
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scope and taken advantage of opportunities and openings in the international system
inherent to globalization. In fact, Barry Desker laments the lack of cooperation among
state members of ASEAN and argues that radical Islam emerged during the expansion of
ASEAN to include all ten states in Southeast Asia, the fall of Suharto in Indonesia, the
financial crisis of the 1990s, and the advent of borders that are more open. 224 In other
words, the realities of the international system and the legitimacy issues of individual
states were significant factors in the coming of age of radical Islam in Southeast Asia.

Muslim Brotherhood Meets Al-Qaeda
The preceding discussion has dealt with how the Muslim Brotherhood and al-Qaeda both
utilized a particular ideology, one of Pan-Islam, in order to build certain levels of support.
In the case of the Muslim Brotherhood, however, one sees a limited expansion –
organizational growth constrained by the state. In the discussion of the Brotherhood, the
state intervenes and reduces the organization’s freedom to expand when the sovereignty
of the state of Egypt - or other state like examples such as the Hama uprising in Syria or
Jordan in its war against the Brotherhood – is sufficiently threatened. The state acted as a
barrier to the evolution of an international Muslim Brotherhood movement and the
Brotherhood stayed relatively local and confined. The power of the Brotherhood would
vacillate based upon the state of relations with the central government.
That said, the same ideology and belief system of the Muslim Brotherhood are
part of a contemporary global reality in the form of al-Qaeda. The al-Qaeda organization
was able to internationalize the belief systems of the Brotherhood. In a study of al-Qaeda
one can see many of the same key personnel and a continuity of ideas from the
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Brotherhood. Political scientists are left with the question of how the beliefs and
organization of the Brotherhood evolved into an international non-state actor – al- Qaeda.
Ultimately, the weakening of states and the ability for a non-state actor to exploit the
global setting allowed the mostly territorially constrained elements of the Muslim
Brotherhood to morph into the international and modern threat of al-Qaeda. A short
discussion of leaders and belief systems of al-Qaeda and their sources helps illustrate the
link between the two groups and, hence, shows how a local non-state actor became
international in scope.
The key personnel that would transition the Muslim Brotherhood into al-Qaeda
were active in Egypt as early as the 1960s. An Egyptian crackdown on the Muslim
Brotherhood in the mid-1960s brought the execution of a key intellectual in the
movement, Sayyid Qutb. After the repression of the mid-1960s, many lost faith in the
Brotherhood. A “new generation” of activists, however, began to emerge. Key among the
“new generation” was Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman. Rahman spoke on the necessity of
creating an Islamic society even if by force. 225 Eventually, Rahman developed contacts
with an underground Egyptian organization called Gama’a Islamiyya. 226 Rahman became
the religious confirmation needed for Gama’a to carry out plots against the Egyptian
government.
In a background of increased unrest, on October 6, 1981, members of the jihadi
movement in Egypt assassinated Egyptian President Anwar Sadat. In the crackdown that
followed, members of Gama’a and other jihadi organizations were summarily jailed. One
such repressed organization was believed to be behind the assassination – the Islamic
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Jihad. Islamic Jihad was the brainchild of Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri. Zawahiri spoke of the
need for violent jihad in order to replace the corrupt government in Egypt. Zawahiri,
however, was committed to local manifestations of Islamic rule.
The narrative continues in the early 1980s. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
resulted in the “great cause” for jihadis in the defeat of the atheist Soviet Union. The
Palestinian question also continued as an issue for many in the Middle East.
Revolutionary and militant groups of all sorts emerged. Yet, these groups were different
from those in the past in the way they conducted themselves - “the operation of this
growing secret world was everywhere facilitated by the trends and technology of
globalization: inexpensive air flight, instant communications, migrant labor, the
uniformity of popular culture.” 227
The so-called Egyptian jihadi, including Zawahiri, realized that more freedom of
movement for the organization could be found elsewhere and began to move to friendlier
environs like Afghanistan and Pakistan and, later, Sudan. What resulted was the
development of an international and global underground movement. The forces of
globalization, the inability of the Soviet Union to defeat the mujahadeen, and the
emergence of a universal cause all contributed to the development of a truly global
movement. In Pakistan and Afghanistan, Abdullah Azzam – who met and shared a
similar world vision as Sheikh Rahman – became a significant leader in the mujahadeen
struggle. Azzam was able to make the movement even more global in nature – he pushed
his contacts in Palestine, Lebanon, Chad, Eritrea, Somalia, Burma, the Philippines,
Yemen and elsewhere to join the cause in Afghanistan. 228
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In the meantime, Rahman traveled to Pakistan in order to experience the jihad. It
is on that trip that Rahman and bin Laden met. Zawahiri also fled to Pakistan – in his case
to build an Islamic Jihad in exile. Whereas Rahman and Zawahiri were focused on the
specific issue of Egypt, Osama bin Laden looked at the jihadi struggle in a much broader
worldview. 229 In 1987, bin Laden toured the Gulf States raising money for his
organization and in 1987 formally announced the creation of al-Qaeda. As a result,
members of the jihadi movement began to shift their challenge from the corrupt Arab
world to “the global system established by infidel power.” 230 Ultimately, according to J.
Boyer Bell, “globalization had encouraged global terror at the very time that the jihad, for
ideological and practical reasons, had embarked on a global holy war.” 231 And, the forces
of jihad began to spread all over the world.
A study of al-Qaeda and its development as a non-state actor with a global reach
must necessarily include a discussion of the Muslim Brotherhood. The ideas are similar,
the strategies are related, and many of the key personnel are the same. Rahman and
Zawahiri both played important roles in the development of Egyptian jihadi groups –
which come from the Muslim Brotherhood. But also, the two are significant players in
the bin Laden story. Indeed, quite a few variables all seemed to contribute to the
transition of a, more or less local Muslim Brotherhood that was constrained by state
boundaries, to a global movement in al-Qaeda. Many of the variables can be explicitly
linked to changes in the international system. To be sure, the forces of globalization and
the “shrinking of the world” is a significant factor. But also, the reduced power of the
state – the reduced ability for a state to maintain a monopoly on power within its own
229

Ibid, 86-87.
Ibid, 92.
231
Ibid, 192.
230

125

territory – allows al-Qaeda to operate virtually unmolested in many areas of the world. In
addition, the continued failure of many states to provide goods and services for its
population allows al-Qaeda the opening to sell its ideology to those willing to listen.

126

Chapter Seven
Implications on the Study of Terrorism
The previous chapters have attempted to show the changing nature and characteristics of
both the international system and the state. The discussion, in chapter two, of the
evolving international system offered a discussion of how the international system is
socially constructed and how those constructs may change. Conversely, chapter three was
an attempt to illustrate the role of the state and how it has changed over time. Toward that
end, chapter four speaks to how the failed state has emerged as an important by-product
of the variables that led to the alteration of the state’s roles. Both the state and system act
as dependent and independent variables and interact in such a way that non-state actors
have assumed more power. Chapter five attempted to illustrate that warfare, like the
state4 and the international system, are social constructs. Finally, chapter six uses a case
study of the Muslim Brotherhood and its contemporary relative, al-Qaeda, in order to
generally apply the conclusions and hypotheses with regard to the international system
and the state.
What follows is a discussion of how these changes at the state and system level
can be applied to the study of terrorism. As alluded to in the previous chapters, the
emerging power of the non-state actor offers evidence of the need for changes in the
research agenda regarding the study of terrorism. A primary contemporary subset of the

127

non-state actor is the emerging violent non-state actors in the form of global terrorist
groups. Terrorists, among their many abilities, often co-opt indigenous violent political
movements in order to achieve certain ends. So, the terrorist actor uses the weakness of
the state and the changing nature of the international system in order to emerge as a
player in international politics in the form of a transnational actor. On point, Ataman
argues the two level model of international relations advanced by Putnam needs to be
altered in order to account for the role of transnational actors. Furthermore, Ataman
points out the problematic approach of studying transnational movements as one lacking
research "connecting transnational factors to either domestic or international settings.” 232
Hence, the transnational movement in the form of a non-state actor operates within the
“grey” and undefined areas of the international system. Moreover, globalization has acted
as a key variable in the creation of transnational entities in the form of non-state actors as
well as elevating their importance in the international system. As a result, Ataman
suggests that the new international political exigency is one of three levels - national,
transnational, and international. For example, the indigenous Mexican Zapatista
movement survived many years in Mexico but only flourished with the information age
and globalization. Once faced with the advances of the communication age inherent to
globalization, the Zapatistas constructed a more powerful and influential movement. At
that point, the Zapatistas were able to advance their ideology in the international system.
Clearly, the attacks of September 11 provide ample illustration of a transnational and
non-state actor influencing not only world politics but also the internal politics of the
world's unchallenged hegemonic leader. 233 The attacks of nineteen individuals of a
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transnational actor claiming allegiance to a non-state actor upon the United States set the
tone for an entire hegemon's foreign policy and strategic vision.
The transnational organization’s growth significantly benefits from a pattern of
self-sufficiency. Clearly, "the more transnational actors command power resources
(material resources) and the more they are institutionalized, the greater impact they have
on state preferences and policies." 234 In fact, many point to the notion that some
transnational actors have greater resources than some state actors. Certainly, many
multinational corporations possess assets and income far superior to a number of states.
In addition, many NGO's enjoy political capital exceeding states. Indeed, the notion of
the all-powerful state first needs examination in through the lenses of the globalized
system of political, economic, and social realities. The evolving system clearly places the
non-state actor as a force in the international system. Ataman provides an outstanding
example of the impact of transnational movements upon the international political system
in examining the rivalry of Shiite Muslims versus Sunni Muslims. In 1979, the emerging
threat posed by Shiite Muslims were balanced by many states, including Turkey, the Gulf
States, and with, at the very minimum, an acquiescence on behalf of the United States,
through the use of Sunni Muslim doctrine as a transnational ideology. 235 Interestingly
enough, the ideological threat posed by Shiite Muslims were balanced and countered with
another ideology – Sunni Islam. Thus, an ideology from an international movement was
countered by another ideology of a transnational movement and not merely by the actions
of state actors.
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Non-state actors, do, indeed, play a significant role in international politics and
theories toward that end should include an accounting for units besides the state. In
addition, such a model is helpful in both predicting future behavior as well as enhancing
security through the development and implementation of a security strategy aimed at the
deterrence of the threats posed by violent non-state actors (VNSA). William Casebeer
and Troy Thomas offered a systemic approach at the 2002 conference of the United
States Air Force Institute for National Security Studies. In their effort, Casebeer and
Thomas operationalize the system of violent non-state actors as one "founded in an
organic systems perspective, which looks at VSNA's as a dynamic biological system
operating within an open environment." The sources of violent behavior of non-state
actors are defined as a "subsystem.” 236 The violent non-state actors operate politically at
levels below the state level. Specifically, the characteristics of state and institutionalized
forms of state power are not inherent to the non-state actor. Furthermore, that is the
point. The non-state actor need not develop identical functions and responsibilities of a
state but only those necessary to exploit latent forms of political capital.
Casebeer and Thomas suggest that certain elements of the state dynamic are
absent from the construction of violent non-state actors. Of significant note, the non-state
actor and system fails in any effort to overcome the "non-rational dimensions of
organizational behavior." In addition, however, to the formal structure, a more informal
system also exists - "which deviates from the well-defined roles imposed by the rational
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structure.” 237 Thus, the non-state actor, in essence, resembles the archetypal structure of
terrorist organizations as advanced from Louis Beam to Carlos Marighella. The VNSA,
according to their premise, should be examined in an "open system." Thus, Casebeer and
Thomas advocate an organic and biological study of VNSA. The conclusions offered by
Casebeer and Thomas are not significantly different from the conclusions in this paper.
The use of an “open system” is very nearly the same as the initial discussion of the felt on
the billiard table allowing for the “space” necessary for the non-state actor to flourish.
The argument that the rational structure of the international system and state do not apply
to the VNSA illustrates the point that the non-state actor and the VNSA are not
constrained by either system.
The open-system analysis of Casebeer and Thomas can be seen with a case study
of Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (AKA Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionaries di
Colombia) The organic process of violent behavior is described in terms of a cyclical
model - (1) FARC imports "some form of energy from the environment" in the guise of
recruits, weapons, tactical training, and the booty from criminal activities, (2) FARC then
takes the environmental input and molds a guerilla fighter, (3) the FARC guerilla is then
taken to Colombia to be used in insurgent activities, (4) "this pattern of activity is cyclic;
the attacks generate new inputs - recruits, resources, government responses, etc." As a
result, the "VNSA seeks negative entropy." In short, the VNSA wants to "import more
energy than it expends.” 238
Working from the assumptions or organic science, Casebeer and Thomas offered
the examination of the life cycle of a VNSA. The gestation, or beginning of life, is the
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mere "conception of an idea for collective violent action." The act of gestation then
"occurs at the intersection of the roots of violence and state failure…" At that point,
"identity entrepreneurs" (defined as anyone who "can exploit existing ethnic, racial,
economic, or social - political differences by elevating someone who shares the same
characteristics as the exploited class to a position of prestige or power") determine the
viability of such a movement. 239 Inherent to the actor, however, is the lack of "recruits,
training, programs, facilities, or sustainable resources." That is, the VNSA must obtain
necessary bodies to fill the ranks and the necessary stage on which to train recruits. The
variables at the gestation period are the same that have been discussed throughout this
paper as key changes in the international system and the state – specifically, state failure
and how individuals perceive their position in the international system.
Next, the organization shifts to the growth phase. Within this phase, the
ideological underpinnings of the movement begin to take shape. The organization, thus,
is created and begins to assume behavior characteristic of organizations. At this point,
deterrence may become a security option because the "VNSA remains heavily focused on
recruitment, developing resources, and establishing an organizational model
(hierarchical, network, cells, etc.) to eventually conduct a sustained campaign of violent
action.” 240 Thus, security and political analysts must recognize the emergence of VNSA
before they have created a hierarchy and organizational model - of some sort - replete
with necessary foot soldiers to engage in violent political activities. That said, the
structure of the globalized international system and weakened effectiveness of the state,
often, allow for the VNSA to successfully complete the growth phase.
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The VNSA also benefits from multi-dimensional growth - growth at the state and
system levels – while appealing to a number of perspectives on how individuals see
themselves in the international system. Applications from other social and scientific
fields attest to the tremendous impact of what can best be termed a multifaceted
motivation of violent non-state actors. Serge Galam and Alain Mauger used the laws of
physics in order to both explain and offer solutions in order to reduce the global terror
threat. 241 The Galam - Mauger thesis argues that classification of terror level - e.g. global
versus local - is best determined in the examination of dimensions. To offer clarification,
a Dayton, Ohio organization may be focused on ending medical testing on mice at an area
University. The organization exists on a one - dimensional scale. If, however, the
organization is devoted to saving laboratory animals from testing and also is against the
serving of meat products in the cafeteria then a second dimension has been added to the
movement. Perhaps the organization's stand is based upon religious beliefs - a third
dimension has been added. An accurate analysis of the political movement is required in
order to determine the dimensional nature of the movement. Then, according to Galam
and Mauger, a "percolation threshold" exists at which point beliefs lead to the co-opting
of "passive support." As a result, the dimension of an organization indirectly relates to
the percolation threshold. That is, the larger the dimension then the lower the percolation
threshold. The use of the physics of disorder is applied in order to suggest solutions in
the war on terror. 242
Galem and Mauger used the concepts of physics in order to present a solution in
reducing the global terror movements. Using models from physics, Galam and Mauger
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argue that the density of terrorism is very difficult to alter - "…even a few percent
reduction of the world passive supporter density would require neutralizing millions of
people, either physically or ideologically, making both options [unethical] and totally
unpractical within reasonable action." 243 Thus, an effort must be made in order to reduce
the density of "passive support" for terrorism. As such, the "percolation threshold"
moves higher. As a result, the best method for attacking the foundations of terrorism can
be found in applying the concepts of classical mechanics. That is, a solution in reducing
terrorism can be formed in addressing the concepts of space. In order to reduce the
support for terrorists one must reduce the number of passive supporters found in the
dimensions of the movement. In formula terms, Galam and Mauger concluded that
where the value Q is equal to the number of dimensions of a terror organization (e.g.
ethnic, religious, geographic) and D is equal to space then an increase of one dimension
yields a two fold space increase, Q=2D. Thus, the success and "novelty of the current
long-range terrorism has been its ability to generate several additional dimensions to its
representative space. Among others, it embeds a religious dimension, a social dimension,
a historical dimension, and a world bi-polarization dimension." 244 In short, the effective
counter then becomes a reduction in the number of dimensions. Indeed, such an effort is
not military but, instead, the focus of economic, political, and social vehicles. Using the
premise of Galam and Mauger, successful strategies in dealing with terrorism would
necessarily reduce the operating space within the international system, address the
weakened state, and deal with the perception individuals have about their position in the
international system.
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To further the explanation of how non-state actors exploit the multi-dimensional
links of non-state actors, Thomas Land observed the apparent links between al-Qaeda and
international criminal organizations. Land contends that al-Qaeda operates in conjunction
with the Russian Mafia - especially in the newly independent states of Central Asia. As a
point in fact, Land argues that it is not coincidental that "the conflict area that embraces
the Caucuses and into Moldova and follows the traditional heroin smuggling route across
Turkey to the Balkans." 245 Land believes it points to the link between al-Qaeda and
simple criminal elements. Also, Land points to a recent Russian report that Russian
intelligence was able to "penetrate" a "diverse group of Islamic terrorist organizations
held recently at the town of Travnik in Bosnia." Furthermore, according to Land, "…the
conference forged a united front endorsing the deployment of any means and
collaboration with any potential ally in pursuit of jihad." 246 Vladimir Orlov, connected
with the Centre for Policy Studies in Moscow, recently revealed an attempt by "foreign
interests" in order to obtain weapons of mass destruction from elements of the Russian
Mafia. 247 Such a note is of great concern because of al-Qaeda's documented desire to
obtain such weapons. Indeed, many documented instances of the seizure of radioactive
materials exist in both Turkmenistan as well as Uzbekistan. Such reports draw concern
when added to a Stanford University Institute for International Studies report that claims
"88 pounds of weapons grade uranium and plutonium has been stolen so far from poorly
guarded nuclear facilities in the former Soviet Union alone.” 248 Furthermore, the case of
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the former Soviet Union - according to the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center augments concern by claiming that "20 tons of `surplus` plutonium" and "500 tons of
surplus highly enriched uranium…" have simply vanished. 249 Land cites other reports
that show that "Moldova is worried by Russian intelligence reports that high-level
representatives of al-Qaeda and Hamas as well as Iran and Chechnya have recently
passed through that country to establish operational bases there.” 250 Once again, a "weak
state" plays a significant role in the manufacturing of hard power by non-state actors.
Indeed, the ubiquitous interest by al-Qaeda in acquiring WMD is a significant red flag
when given the behavioral model and lack of systemic constraints with regard to nonstate actors in the geopolitical environment many politicians still view through the lenses
of realism. But also, the WMD example illustrates the issue of non-state actors as a multidimensional organization.
Land's argument is bolstered by Roos who also cites examples of terror
organizations linking with criminal groups. Roos believes that the fall of the Soviet
Union, in fact, led to enhanced cooperation between terror groups and entities primarily
devoted to criminal enterprises. As a result, the cooperation has created truly
transnational organizations in both scope and impact - "because narcotraffickers and
terrorist organizations often work hand-in-hand, their span of influence is truly
international. Together they have become the most powerful force in the criminal
world.” 251 Roos also points to the use of criminal groups as a source of terrorist financing
citing that "…drug money flowing to and from the Middle East and Eastern Europe is
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now believed to fund organizations ranging from Hezbollah affiliates to the Kosovo
Liberation Army." 252 In essence, political entrepreneurs take advantage of political,
economic, social, and ideological vacuums. Criminal activity is part and parcel of a
larger universe of exploitable political opportunity.
The ideas of the post-Cold War international system, the behavior of non-state
actors, terrorism, and state capacity and failure all diverge into a grand level theory that
can be used in order to predict system-wide outcomes. The old paradigm of deterrence is
dangerously anarchistic in the determination of security policy. Instead, state actors are
faced with the problem of "denial." That is, the state actors must "deny" non-state actors
the dimensions and space in order to operate within the international system. Otherwise,
domestic policy inputs and localized conflicts run the risk of emerging in a transnational
scope - especially those ideologically based. Contemporary history is one replete with
struggles of ideology - World War I was based upon a nationalistic ideology, World War
II featured the struggles of fascist ideology, and the Cold War was part of the struggle of
communist and socialist ideology. Yet, common to the historical ideological
confrontations was the behavior and motivation at the hands of state actors. Today, the
system of ideological confrontations more prominently features non-state actors and
terrorist groups.
M.G. Marshall compiled a helpful database in order to study the roots of terror
actors. Marshall created a summary of “Actor Nationalities in Reported Terror

252

Please see Roos. In addition, a relevant discussion can also be found in Rachel Ehrenfeld, Funding Evil
(Chicago: Bonus Books, 2003).

137

Incidents.” 253 Marshall coded the actor nationalities of all terror actors from 1991 to 2001
on a five point scale:

Table 7 - Marshall’s Global Terror Base - Coding
Classification Description
5

Greater than 1000 deaths

4

Greater than 200 but less than or equal to 1000 deaths

3

Greater than 100 but less than or equal to 200 deaths

2

Greater than 20 but less than or equal to 100 deaths

1

Greater than 0 but less than 20 deaths

0

No deaths

Marshall’s coding allows for a breakdown and examination of terror incidents through a
state analysis of the home of originating terrorists. From this information, it is possible to
draw conclusions and make predictions with regard to the variables associated with states
that produce terrorists.
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Found in Monty G. Marshall “Global Terrorism: An Overview and Analysis.” Center for
Systemic Peace accessed online at members.aol.com/CSPmgm.
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Table 8 – Marshall’s “Actor Nationalities in Reported Terror Incidents, 1991-2001”
5 Afghanistan
5 Algeria
5 Burundi
5 Democratic Republic
Congo
5 India
5 Indonesia
5 Liberia
5 Rwanda
5 Sri Lanka
5 Sudan

4 Angola
4 Brazil
4 Chad
4 Colombia
4 Ivory Coast
4 Equatorial Guinea
4 Israel
4 Nigeria
4 Pakistan
4 Philippines
4 Russia
4 South Africa
4 Turkey
4 Uganda
3 Bangladesh
3 China
3 Egypt
3 Georgia
3 Iraq
3 Kenya
3 Lebanon
3 Mexico
3 Myanmar
3 Nepal

2 Congo- Brazzaville
2 El Salvador
2 Guatemala
2 Guinea

1
1
1
1

2 Haiti
2 Iran
2 Macedonia
2 Senegal
2 Somalia
2 Spain

1
1
1
1
1
1

2 Togo
2 United Kingdom
2 Yemen
1 Albania
1 Argentina
1 Armenia
1 Australia
1 Austria
1 Azerbaijan
1 Bahrain
1 Belarus
1 Belgium
1 Bolivia
1 Cameroon
1 Canada
1 Central African
Republic
1 Chile
1 Cuba
1 Cyprus
1 Ecuador
1 Ethiopia
1 Fiji
1 France
1 Germany
1 Greece

3 Peru
3 Sierra Leone
3 United States
3 Yugoslavia

1 Guyana
1 Honduras
1 Hungary
1 Italy
1 Japan
2 Bosnia and Herzegovina 1 Kuwait
2 Cambodia

1 Laos

Latvia
Lesotho
Madagascar
Malaysia

0
0
0
0

Estonia
Finland
Gabon
Gambia

New Zealand
Nicaragua
Niger
North Korea
Panama
Papua New
Guinea
1 Poland
1 Romania
1 Saudi Arabia
1 Slovakia
1 Swaziland
1 Sweden
1 Switzerland
1 Syria
1 Taiwan
1 Tajikistan
1 Tanzania
1 Thailand
1 Tunisia
1 Ukraine
1 Uzbekistan
1 Venezuela
1 Vietnam

0
0
0
0
0
0

Ghana
Guinea-Bissau
Iceland
Ireland
Jamaica
Jordan

1 Zambia
1 Zimbabwe
0 Benin
0 Bhutan
0 Botswana
0 Bulgaria
0 Burkina Faso
0 Comoros
0 Costa Rica
0 Croatia
0 Czech Republic
0 Denmark
0 Djibouti
0 Dominican
Republic
0 Eritrea

0 Kazakhstan
0 Kyrgyzstan
0 Libya
0 Lithuania
0 Luxembourg
0 Malawi
0 Mali
0 Mauritania
0 Mauritius
0 Moldova
0 Mongolia
0 Morocco
0 Mozambique
0 Namibia
0 Netherlands
0 Norway
0 Oman
0 Paraguay
0 Portugal
0 Qatar
0 Singapore
0 Slovenia
0 South Korea
0 Trinidad
0 Turkmenistan
0 United Arab
Emirates
0 Uruguay
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A series of simple statistical tests reveals many commonalities with states that produce
terrorists of assorted levels of violent behavior and those that do not. Using Marshall’s
terror data and his classifications of regimes as “full democracy,” “partial democracy,”
and “autocracy” reveals that partial democracies appear to be most likely to produce
deadly terrorists.

Table 9 – Terror Scores by Regime Type 254

State Category

Mean Terror Score

Full Democracy

1.031

Difference from
Mean (All States)
-29.58%

Partial Democracy

1.813

23.84%

Autocracy

1.754

19.80%

All States

1.464

NA

Obviously, the full democracy fairs best but, notably, partial democracies create slightly
more deaths from terrorism than do even autocracies. A PRE test based upon a multiple
number of variables indicates an assorted number of factors associated with the Marshall
terror scale.

254

Regime type data from State Failure Task Force Report: Phase III, p.15.
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Table 10 - Terrorism PRE Scores on State Variables 255
Variable

PRE Score

Significance

Population (thousands)

39.70%

.000 significance

Imports and Export (% of GDP)

-39.6%

.000 significance

Ethno-Linguistic Heter (3 category)

27.2%

.018 significance

Civil Liberties

23.9%

.001 significance

Legitimacy 1999

-23.0%

.011 significance

Political Rights Score

-19.8%

.005 significance

Percent Labor Force Women

-18.4%

.027 significance

Percent Population largest ethnic group

17.8%

.014 significance

Percent Income by top 10%

17.7%

.032 significance

Human Development Score (Hi = more)

-16.9%

.028 significance

A comparison of means between state capacity – in the form of legitimacy and
effectiveness - and terror provides a bit more mixed results. Clearly, the states with mean
levels of legitimacy and effectiveness above the overall mean fair quite well in a study of
terrorism. In addition, negative expressions of legitimacy and effectiveness ultimately
tend to result in more deadly terrorists produced.

255

Variables taken from Pollock.
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Table 11 - Terrorism – Legitimacy and Effectiveness 256
Terror Category

99 Legit Mean

99 Effect Mean

0

0.488

0.2024

1

0.1183

0.0589

2

-0.131

0.457

3

-0.546

-0.272

4

-0.21

-0.104

5

-0.337

-0.77

Overall Mean

0.135

0.0188

The statistical implication is very clear – states that boast a higher capacity tend to
produce fewer terrorists. Thus, the question becomes one of the ability of the state to
serve its constituency. As discussed, the levels of both effectiveness and legitimacy have
fallen since the end of the Cold War era. The number of failed states has increased in the
time since the fall of the Soviet Union. At the same time, the levels of political rights and
civil liberties have increased dramatically. In short, the end of the Cold War allowed “…
relatively disciplined forces give way to decentralized, sporadic, and criminal problems
of organized violence.” 257 So, the international system features less state versus state
violence and more violent activity by non-state actors. In fact, many argue the fact that
“… global warfare has been reduced by over sixty percent since 1991” as appropriate
context for viewing the future of conflict and power politics.258
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The true state of the international system, however, is vastly different. The state’s
level of aggregate power is less while non-state actors increase in terms of international
power. Although state versus state conflicts are declining, many states face threats of a
much different nature – “over one-third of the world’s countries (54 of 158) were directly
affected by serious societal warfare at some time during the 1990’s and, of these states,
nearly two-thirds (34) experienced armed conflicts for seven or more years during the
decade.” 259 Such conflict, surely, adds to the weakening nature of the state. Indeed, the
ubiquitous presence of societal conflict demands that assets earmarked for state capacity
functions to, instead, serve as protection for the ruling elite. As the state weakens “…
conflict liabilities can move rather easily from strengthening societies to weaker societies
and take advantage of new and future opportunities.” 260 Thus, the cycle of state
devolution continues.
Another significant input in the weakening of the state is the number of
anocracies within the system. Marshall and Gurr define the anocracy as a state
somewhere between democracy and autocracy. The end of the Cold War Era brought
about an explosion in anocracies – from 16 in 1985 to 28 in 2002. 261 The mere presence
of increased numbers of anocracies makes the system more dangerous – over 50%
experience “a major regime change within five years,” are “six times more likely than
democracies” “and two and a half times as likely as autocracies to experience new
outbreaks of societal wars” and, ultimately, the anocracy “… are less likely to repress or
settle it [armed societal conflict].” 262 As the state’s capacity weaken, the space for the
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non-state actor within the system increases. As a result, security within the new
international system is much different than the days of simple deterrence. Contemporary
security is more proactive – involves preemption militarily and politically. The
international system, as a whole, is weakened whenever a member state is weakened.
To be sure, what has been presented is only a small piece of the overall puzzle.
The overall point to my discussion is that a system level analysis of international relations
is more complex than ever before. Factors including non-state actors, failed states,
transition regimes, and globalization have all reduced the unitary power of the state to act
within that system. Ultimately, the terror attacks of 9/11 served notice that non-state
actors would play a significant role in the international relations models of the future.
Further research should engage to identify the additional variables that impact the
changes in the international and state levels of analysis. What has been provided in this
paper has been an attempt to draw together a number of variables in order to demonstrate
the complexity of a nested – or two level system – and the complications in readily
illustrating the characteristics of the international system as they exist in contemporary
international politics.
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